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CAVEAT WHO?:  A REVIEW OF THE LANDLORD/TENANT 




Jerald  Clifford McKinney, II* 
 
Bad things happen. People make mistakes. Evil exists in the world, as 
does stupidity, which may be the superlative source of many tort and con- 
tract claims. Claims of liability will inevitably arise in the landlord/tenant 
relationship. This article will explore the liability of a landlord in Arkansas 
when a tenant, guest of a tenant, or a third party claims injury. It will also 
look at the obligations of landlords to maintain leased premises as well as 
examine how language in a lease agreement (or the lack thereof) can affect 
the liability and responsibilities of the parties.  This article will try to answer 
whether the landlord/tenant relationship in Arkansas should still be viewed 
as truly caveat lessee, which will include examining the Arkansas General 
Assembly’s  codification  of  the  caveat  lessee  doctrine.  Where  applicable, 
this article will discuss distinctions between commercial and residential ten- 
ancies. 
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to reveal a little of the author’s 
background. My background is that of a lease drafter, representing both ten- 
ants and landlords mostly in the commercial  context. I write leases—I do 
not litigate tort claims. Consequently, the aim of this article is to explore the 
contractual and practical liabilities and obligations of the parties as opposed 
to creating a “how to handle a tort claim” guide. 
Caveat  lessee  means  “lessee  beware”  and  provides  that  the  leased 
premises are taken “as is” unless the lease agreement specifies otherwise.1 
The doctrine means, “absent fraud or an express provision in the lease, the 
landlord [has] absolutely no obligation to repair or maintain the leased 
premises.”2  As stated by one court, “The tenant hires at his peril, and a rule 
similar to that of caveat emptor applies, and throws on the lessee the respon- 
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1.   Corey Mostafa, The Implied Warranty  of Habitability,  Foreseeability, and Landlord 
Liability for Third-Party  Criminal Acts Against Tenants, 54 UCLA L. REV. 971, 975 (2007). 
2.   Brian  A. Montague,  Exculpatory  Clause  in Residential  Lease  Absolving Lessor  of 
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sibility of examining as to the existence of defects in the premises, and of 
providing against their ill-effects.”3 Since the landlord has no obligation to 
repair or maintain the leased premises, the landlord is “not liable to the ten-
ant or the tenant’s invitees for injuries caused by the defective condition of 
the premises.”4
Some jurisdictions have abandoned the caveat lessee doctrine, and 
most have created significant exceptions.5 As one commentator said, “To-
day, at least in the residential lease context, the doctrine is virtually dead.”6
Much has been written on the topic of the caveat lessee doctrine, mostly 
critical.7 The criticism has been the same in Arkansas, with law review arti-
cles and comments being primarily critical of the doctrine.8 However, the 
purpose of this article is not to join the debate calling for the end of the ca-
veat lessee doctrine or criticizing the doctrine, but simply to describe the 
current status of the law. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has consistently 
upheld the doctrine for more than a century. Just a few years ago, the Ar-
kansas General Assembly codified and reaffirmed the essential elements of 
the common law doctrine.  In 2012, the Non-Legislative Commission for the 
Study of Landlord-Tenant Law released a report that compared Arkansas’s 
landlord-tenant law with that of other states, making findings and recom-
mendations. The report discusses tort liability of landlords, but the Commis-
sion split on the issue of tort liability and thus made no recommendation.9
Regardless of the merits for or against the caveat lessee doctrine, the doc-
trine exists in Arkansas, and this article’s purpose is to report on the current 
3. Watson v. Almirall, 70 N.Y.S. 662, 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901).
4. Montague, supra note 2, at 916.
5. Jamie M. Powers, Oklahoma Landlords Beware:  Miller v. David Grace, Inc. Aban-
dons Caveat Emptor in Residential Leases, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 361, 361 (2011). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 13, topic 3, § 357 (1965); Samuel R. Gilbert, Don’t Let 
Them Bite:  Defining the Responsibilities of Landlords and Tenants in the Event of a Bedbug 
Infestation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 251 (2011); Paula C. Murray, The Evolution of 
Implied Warranties in Commercial Real Estate Leases, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 145, 152-54
(1994); Mostafa, supra note 1, at 975.
6. Murray, supra note 5, at 152.
7. A WestlawNext search on 11-30-12 with the search term “caveat lessee” produced 
622 secondary source listings.
8. See, e.g., Kathryn Hake, Is Home Where Arkansas’s Heart Is?:  State Adopts Unique 
Statutory Approach to Landlord Tort Liability and Maintains Common Law “Caveat Les-
see”, 59 ARK. L. REV. 737 (2006); Stephen J. Maddex, Propst v. McNeill:  Arkansas Land-
lord-Tenant Law, A Time for Change, 51 ARK. L. REV. 575 (1998); Ashley E. Norman, A
Tenant’s Dilemma:  The Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, 62 ARK. L. REV.
859 (2009); Marshall Prettyman, The Landlord Protection Act, Arkansas Code § 18-17-101
Et Seq., 2008 ARK. L. NOTES 71 (2008).
9. STEPHEN R. GILES ET AL., Non-Legislative Commission for the Study of Landlord-
Tenant  Law, December  31,  2012, at *27 http://www.arkansasjustice.org/sites/default/files
/file%20attachments/Landlord-Tenant%20Commission%20Report.pdf.
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state of the law as case law continues to put twists and turns into the doc-
trine.10
I. HISTORY OF THE CAVEAT LESSEE DOCTRINE
The doctrine originally developed in the Middle Ages.11 When the doc-
trine developed, a lease was considered a conveyance of land that was treat-
ed essentially like a sale of land except for the obligation to pay rent.12 The 
lease arrangement typically gave the tenant virtually all control and all re-
sponsibility for the leased property, even to the point that the common law 
allowed the tenant to eject the landlord as a trespasser during the term of the 
lease.13 The landlord’s sole obligation at common law was to provide quiet 
10. Though criticisms can certainly be made to the doctrine, as is true of most legal 
doctrines, there can also be unintended consequences from changes made to a doctrine that 
has existed for more than one hundred years.  As a court in another jurisdiction recently not-
ed, “courts attempt to ‘avoid capricious departures from bedrock legal rules, as such tectonic 
shifts might produce unforeseen and undesirable consequences.’” Hill v. Sears, Roebuck and 
Co., 822 N.W.2d 190, 201 (Mich. 2012) (quoting Bob Young, A Judicial Traditionalist Con-
fronts the Common Law, 8 TEXAS REV. L & POL. 299, 307 (2004)).
According to the National Low Income Housing Collation, Out of Reach 2012 
America’s Forgotten Housing Crisis, Arkansas ranks 51st on a list ranking states from the 
most expensive to the least expensive for residential housing with Hawaii, District of Colum-
bia, California, New Jersey and Maryland ranking as the five most expensive based on the 
cost of leasing a two bedroom house relative to income.  See Out of Reach 2012, NAT’L LOW 
INCOME HOUS. COAL. (March 2012), http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/2012-OOR.pdf. As 
discussed in this article, all five of these jurisdictions have completely or mostly abandoned 
the caveat lessee doctrine.  Of course, there could be other factors contributing to the cost 
difference, but the existence of the difference is worth consideration in any debate over the 
value of preserving the caveat lessee doctrine.  Also, of the other four states in the five most 
affordable, Mississippi, Kentucky, South Dakota and West Virginia, all have some (though 
variable) version of a statutory or case law imposed warranty of habitability. See State Adop-
tions of URLTA Landlord Duties, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/state-adoptions-of-urlta-landlord-duties.aspx.
Even courts that have abandoned the doctrine, however, have acknowledged the potentially 
high financial costs associated with doing so. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment. 
Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
11. Corey Mostafa, supra note 1, at 975; Powers, supra note 5, at 363. Some have ar-
gued the doctrine developed in part because tenants in the Middle Ages were more “self-
sufficient” than modern tenants and could “perform all repairs required on the leased premis-
es.” Shannon E. Kelly, South Dakota Supreme Court Opens the Door to Landlord Liability 
for Criminal Attacks Committed by Third Parties on the Premises:  Smith v. Lagow Con-
struction & Development Company, 48 S.D. L. REV. 365, 371 (2003). See also Joan L. 
Neisser, The Tenant as Consumer: Applying Strict Liability Principles to Landlords, 64 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 527, 531 (1990) and Jamie M. Powers, Oklahoma Landlords Beware:  Miller 
v. David Grace, Inc. Abandons Caveat Emptor in Residential Leases, 63 Okla. L. Rev. 361, 
363-64 (2011).
12. Mostafa, supra note 1, at 975.
13. Id.
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enjoyment of the leased premises to the tenant.14 The tenant’s obligation was 
to pay rent, which was an independent obligation, meaning that the rent 
could not be withheld even if the landlord breached any of its obligations.15
Even if the landlord had a contractual obligation to maintain the premises, 
under the doctrine of independent covenants, the tenant’s obligation to pay 
rent remained an independent obligation with breach of any landlord obliga-
tion, compensable only by the right to pursue a suit for damages.16 Since the 
obligation to pay rent was an independent obligation, the landlord could 
seek to evict the tenant if a tenant failed to pay rent during a dispute with the 
landlord.17
Nearly two hundred years ago, courts in various states began eroding 
the caveat lessee doctrine, arguably corresponding to the switch from pre-
dominately agricultural leases to more urbanized leases of buildings rather 
than land.18 As one observer noted, during the Industrial Revolution and the 
switch to a more urban society, “The structures on the land, rather than the 
land itself became the focus of the lease.”19 Courts began viewing leases 
primarily as contracts rather than as conveyances of land.20 This was im-
portant because, “Since rules of property law solidified before the develop-
ment of mutually dependent covenants in contract law, theoretically once an 
estate was leased, there were no further unexecuted acts to be performed by 
the landlord and there could be no failure of consideration.”21 Under a con-
tract theory, the covenants in the lease are governed by the doctrine of mu-
tually dependent covenants, meaning that the tenant’s obligation to pay rent 
could be relieved by the landlord’s failure to perform any of its material 
obligations under the lease.22 Also, courts began exercising powers of equity 
in situations where the court viewed the landlord’s exercise of remedies to 
14. Murray, supra note 5, at 145.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 147. See also Halifax Eng’g, Inc. v. Doyle, Inc., 23 Va. Cir. 466, 466 (1991)( 
“At common law, the tenant’s covenant to pay rent and the landlord’s express covenants in 
the lease were viewed as independent and, therefore, the tenant’s obligation to pay rent was 
not affected by the landlord’s breach of an express covenant of the lease.”); RICHARD A.
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 44:42 (4th ed. 1993).
17. Murray, supra note 5, at 147.
18. Mostafa, supra note 1, at 975.
19. Murray, supra note 5, at 148.
20. Mostafa, supra note 5, at 975. Today, leases are generally viewed as being both a 
conveyance and a contract. See Montague, supra note 2, at 914. See also Neisser, supra note 
11, at 527.
21. Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d, 470, 472 (Haw. 1969).
22. Lord, supra note 16. See also Melissa Gainor, Wesson v. Leone Enterprises, Inc.: A
Misguided Approach, 84 B.U.L. REV. 769, 780 (2004); Gary Goldman, Uniform Commercial 
Landlord and Tenant Act—A Proposal to Reform “Law out of Context”, 19 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 175, 177 (2002).
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be heavy-handed or unjust.23 Opponents of the caveat lessee doctrine argued 
that the doctrine’s agrarian-based history makes it “inapplicable to the reali-
ty of the modern urban setting of most contemporary residential leases.”24
As one commentator argued, “Urban tenants are less likely to be able to 
repair defects in the unit than were self-sufficient farmers at the time that the 
caveat lessee doctrine was developed, and owners of typical multiunit 
apartment buildings today have more bargaining power in comparison to 
individual renters than landlords did over tenant farmers in the past.”25
As courts began to change their view of leases, exceptions to the caveat 
lessee doctrine began to develop.26 Four “standard” exceptions developed:  
(1) hidden dangers known to the landlord but unknown to the tenant; (2) 
premises leased for public use; (3) common areas retained under the land-
lord’s control; and (4) premise negligently repaired by the landlord.27 These 
exceptions applied to both residential and commercial leases.28 Other excep-
tions and defenses for the tenant also developed, most notably: (1) a breach 
of an implied warranty of habitability for residential leases; (2) a construc-
tive eviction defense to the payment of rent in certain circumstances; and (3) 
a breach of an implied warranty of suitability for purpose for buildings un-
der construction.29 These exceptions will be explored in greater detail later 
in this article.
II. STATUS OF THE CAVEAT LESSEE DOCTRINE IN ARKANSAS
Arkansas courts have recognized the caveat lessee doctrine for more 
than a century;30 In 1910, the Supreme Court of Arkansas articulated its ap-
proach to the caveat lessee doctrine, saying that, “[u]nless a landlord agrees 
with his tenant to repair leased premises, he cannot, in the absence of a stat-
ute, be compelled to do so, and cannot be held liable for repairs.”31 A few 
years later, the state supreme court further articulated the law in Arkansas by
23. Murray, supra note 5, at 148. See also Lord, supra note 16.
24. Gilbert, supra note 5, at 251.
25. Id. at 251–52.
26. Mostafa, supra note 1, at 975.
27. Powers, supra note 5, at 364–65.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 13, 
topic 3, § 357 (1965). 
28. Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty; The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 99, 102 (1982).
29. Mostafa, supra note 1, at 975. See also LORD, supra note 16; Gilbert, supra note 5, 
at 251; Murray, supra note 5, at 152–54; Powers, supra note 5, at 365.
30. Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark. 623, 624, 932 S.W.2d 766, 767 (1996).
31. Delaney v. Johnson, 95 Ark. 131, 131, 128 S.W. 859, 860 (1910). See also Propst, 
326 Ark. at  624, 932 S.W.2d 766, 767 (1996) (“[U]nder that rule, unless a landlord agrees 
with his tenant to repair leased premises, he cannot, in the absence of statute, be compelled to 
do so or be held liable for repairs.”).
1054 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
saying, “[i]t is the settled rule of common law that there is no implied cove-
nant by the lessor that the leased premises are in good repair or fit for the 
intended use, nor that the premises shall continue to be suitable for the les-
see’s use or business.”32 The court continued, “[i]n other words, in the ab-
sence of fraud or concealment, the tenant leases at his peril, and the rule in 
the nature of caveat emptor throws upon the lessee the responsibility of ex-
amining the demised premises for defects and providing against their conse-
quences before he enters into the lease.”33 In an older decision, the court 
stated, “in the absence of fraud or concealment, the tenant leases at his peril, 
and the rule in the nature of caveat emptor throws upon the lessee the re-
sponsibility of examining the demised premises for defects and providing 
against their consequences before he enters into the lease.”34
Arkansas’ caveat lessee approach to landlord-tenant law was solidified 
in the 1932 case of Joseph v. Riffel.35 In Joseph, the plaintiff fell through an 
open elevator shaft that was “open, unguarded, unlighted and in darkness 
and without [a]danger sign . . . .”36 The court in Joseph recited common law 
doctrine that “’in the absence of statute or agreement, the landlord is under 
no legal obligation to light common passageways for the benefit of ten-
ants.’”37 The court further stated,
On the analogy of a lack of duty on the part of the landlord to light 
common passageways, it has been held that a landlord is not liable for 
injury received by tenant [sic] through the failure of the landlord to sup-
ply rails or guards when the condition was the same at the time of let-
ting.38
The court cited no case law in the decision but noted that there was no 
law requiring elevator openings in a commercial facility to have rails, 
guards, lights or warning signs.39 The court also refused to consider that the 
premises may have been improperly constructed, saying, 
We cannot indulge the presumption that the shafts or wells in which the 
elevators were lifted and lowered from floor to floor were improperly 
32. Little Rock Ice Co. v. Consumers’ Ice Co., 114 Ark. 532, 532, 170 S.W. 241, 243 
(1914).
33. Id.
34. Rogers v. Rob Roy Plantation Co., 208 Ark. 429, 432, 186 S.W.2d 661, 662 (1945).
35. Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 120, 890 S.W.2d 250, 251 (1994)( “Since 1932, 
Arkansas has adhered to the general rule that, as between a landlord and tenant, the landlord 
is under no legal obligation to a tenant for injuries sustained in common areas, absent a stat-
ute or agreement.”)
36. Joseph v. Riffel, 186 Ark. 418, 53, S.W.2d 987, 988 (1932).
37. Id. (citing 36 C. J. § 891).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 418, 53, S.W.2d at 988–89.
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constructed because they had no railings around them or guards or sig-
nals upon them, considering the uses for which they were intended, nor 
can we presume a necessity for lights in the corridors.40
By holding the landlord not to be liable, the court noted that the lease 
agreement did not specify that any of these items would be in the building.41
Since Joseph, Arkansas courts have generally stayed loyal to the caveat 
lessee doctrine. Indeed, "[t]he doctrine of caveat lessee, which states that 
unless a landlord agrees with his tenant to repair leased premises he cannot, 
in the absence of a statute, be compelled to do so, is firmly established law 
in this state.”42 Many plaintiffs, however, have assaulted the doctrine over 
the years.  
In 1996, in Propst v. McNeill, the Supreme Court of Arkansas specifi-
cally addressed a challenge that the caveat lessee doctrine is outdated.43 The 
tenant argued that the modern rule should eliminate caveat lessee in favor of 
compelling landlords to “exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an 
unreasonable risk of harm.”44 The tenant, whose airplane was damaged in a 
storm due to a faulty building, argued “that Arkansas has become less rural, 
and consequently tenants have become less informed and too ill-equipped to 
judge the structural integrity of buildings with which they are unfamiliar.”45
The tenant further argued “that landlords, on the other hand, are generally 
familiar with their properties either through firsthand knowledge of the con-
dition of the properties or through knowledge imputed to them by persons 
hired to manage their properties.”46
While acknowledging that most states have eliminated the caveat les-
see doctrine, the Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected the tenant’s argu-
ment,47 noting several cases that attacked the caveat lessee doctrine, includ-
ing the Supreme Court of New Hampshire case, Sargent v. Ross. In Sargent 
v. Ross, the New Hampshire Supreme Court described the caveat lessee
doctrine in extremely harsh terms, referring to it as a “’scandal’”48 and “an 
artificial and illogical rule.”49 The court “discard[ed] the rule of ‘caveat les-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Adkinson v. Kilgore, 62 Ark. App. 247, 254, 970 S.W.2d 327, 331 (1998).




47. Id. at 626, 932 S.W.2d at 768.
48. Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 530 (1973) (quoting Quinn and Phillips, THE LAW OF 
LANDLORD TENANT: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE PAST WITH GUIDELINES FOR THE 
FUTURE, 38 FORD. L. REV. 225 (1969)).
49. Sargent, 308 A.2d at 531 (quoting Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to 
Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1949)).
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see’ and the doctrine of landlord nonliability to which it gave birth.”50 After
giving consideration to the claimed merits of these negative cases, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court held:
Because of the policy considerations and possible impact that would en-
sue in enlarging a landlord’s liability, there is merit in the argument that 
such matters might be dealt with better in the legislative arena. In any 
event, this court has steadfastly adhered to the caveat lessee rule for one 
hundred years without a hint it might consider abandoning it. This court 
has held that it is a matter of public policy to uphold prior decisions un-
less great injury or injustice would result.51
Without expressly adopting a position on the policy issues, the Court in 
Propst noted several policy considerations for keeping the caveat lessee
doctrine, most notably that the doctrine “serves Arkansas’s constitutionally 
declared public policy of respecting its citizens’ right to contract” and “elim-
inating caveat lessee will not result in more protections, but instead in fewer 
options for the tenant [because a change could “eliminate the productive and 
beneficial use of marginal structures, absent landlord repair and insurance 
against possible liability”].”52
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not completely foreclose 
the possibility of changing or eliminating the rule in the future even without 
the General Assembly changing the doctrine legislatively.53 The Court noted 
that the Propst case concerned “a businessman who owns a plane and was 
not shown to be someone who could not appreciate the risk of storing his 
plane in an old hangar.”54 The Court stated that it did not see this type of 
situation or facts as warranting a departure from the long-standing caveat 
lessee doctrine.55
Five years later, a plaintiff in another case asked the Arkansas Supreme 
Court to overturn the doctrine of caveat lessee.56 In the case of Thomas v. 
Stewart, the plaintiff’s son leaned against a defective second-floor balcony 
railing and suffered numerous injuries when he fell.57 The Court again de-
clined to overturn the doctrine but again stated that “we do not foreclose the 
possibility of considering this issue in the future.”58 The Court listed several 
50. Sargent, 308 A.2d at 534 (1973).
51. Propst, 326 Ark. at 626, 932 S.W.2d at 768 (citing Independence Fed. Bank, F.S.B. 
v. Paine Weber, 302 Ark. 324, 331–32, 789 S.W.2d 725, 730 (1990)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 627, 932 S.W.2d at 768.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 41, 60 S.W.3d 415, 420 (2001).
57. Id. at 36, 60 S.W.3d at 416.
58. Id. at 41, 60 S.W.3d at 420.
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reasons for declining to overturn the doctrine.59 First, the Court found the 
plaintiff’s brief on the issue to be deficient because it cited only one case 
(the 1973 Sargent v. Ross case from New Hampshire) with any authority on 
the issue of the caveat lessee doctrine, which was the same case the Court 
had already addressed and rejected in the Propst case.60 Second, the Court 
found that the plaintiff’s appellate brief failed to apprise the Court of any 
developments since the Propst decision that would cause the Court to 
change direction.61 Third, the Court noted that it had not invited, or received, 
amicus curiae briefs from interested organizations on the issue as the Court 
did in 1970 when it modified the caveat emptor doctrine in the context of 
the sale of new houses.62
The Court in Thomas effectively painted a roadmap for what it would 
consider to overturn the doctrine of caveat lessee. The Court in Thomas par-
ticularly focused on its desire for the General Assembly to weigh in on the 
issue, with the majority restating its position in Propst that “the question of 
landlord liability was more properly a question for the General Assembly.”63
However, Justice Brown concurred in the decision, agreeing that the issue 
was not adequately briefed for consideration in this case, but arguing rather 
forcefully that the time may have come for the Court to give serious recon-
sideration of the doctrine of caveat lessee since the General Assembly had 
failed to act in the three legislative sessions since the Propst case.64
The General Assembly got the message from Justice Brown.  On Feb-
ruary 17, 2005, Representative Robert Thompson introduced House Bill 
1766 titled “An Act to Clarify the Responsibilities of Landlords.”65 House 
Bill 1766 began with a preamble that read:
Section 1.  Statement of legislative purpose and intent.
(a) The General Assembly finds that the Arkansas Supreme Court has 
requested its guidance regarding the law pertaining to a landlord’s liabil-
ity to tenants and tenant’s licensees and invitees for death, injuries, or 
property damage suffered on the leased premises that are proximately 
caused by defects or disrepair on the premises.
(b) As the Supreme Court recognized in Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33,
60 S.W.3d 415 (2001) and Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark. 623, 932 S.W.2d 
766 (1996), for more than a century, Arkansas law has adhered to the 
59. Id.
60. Id. (mentioning Sargent, supra note 49, 308 A.2d 528 (1973)).
61. Id.
62. Thomas, 347 Ark. at 42, 60 S.W.3d at 420.
63. Id. at 41, 60 S.W.3d at 420.
64. Id. at 42–43, 60 S.W.3d at 421.
65. H.B. 1766, 2006 Leg., 85th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2005).
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common law principle under which a landlord has no liability to a tenant 
or tenant’s guests absent the landlord’s:
(1) Agreement supported by consideration or assumption by conduct of a 
duty to undertake repair and maintenance; and
(2) Failure to perform the agreement or assumed duty in a reasonable 
manner.
(c)(1) The General Assembly further finds that the Supreme Court has 
properly and correctly interpreted and applied the law and that existing 
law should not be altered or extended.
(2) The purpose and intent of Section 2 of this act is to codify this rule of 
law as it exists under Arkansas common law.
The bill was given a “Do Pass” recommendation by the House Public 
Health, Welfare and Labor Committee on February 24, 2005.66 The bill 
passed the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives on February 25, 
2005 by a vote of 62 Yeas, 24 Nays, 13 Not Voting, and 1 Voting Present.67
The bill was then referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary where it 
received a “Do Pass” recommendation on March 7, 2005.68 The bill passed 
the Democrat-controlled Senate almost unanimously on March 15, 2005, by 
a vote of 34 Yeas and 1 Excused Absence.69 During the process, the bill was 
not amended from how it was originally introduced.70 The bill was transmit-
ted to Governor Mike Huckabee on March 16, 2005, and returned five days 
later as Act 928 of 2005.71
As codified, the Act reads:
18-16-110. Landlord’s liability arising from alleged defects or disrepair 
of premises.
No landlord or agent or employee of a landlord shall be liable 
to a tenant or a tenant’s licensee or invitee for death, personal 
66. Bill Status History, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2005/R/Pages/BillStatus
History.aspx?measureno=HB1766 (accessed December 9, 2012).
67. HB 1766–An Act to Clarify the Responsibilities of Landlords, http://www.arkleg.
state.ar.us/assembly/2005/R/Pages/Votes.aspx?rcsnum=651&votechamber=House (accessed 
December 9, 2012).  The Arkansas House of Representatives has one hundred members.
68. Bill Status History, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2005/R/Pages/BillStatus
History.aspx?measureno=HB1766 (accessed December 9, 2012).
69. HB 1766 –An Act to Clarify the Responsibilities of Landlords, http://www.arkleg.
state.ar.us/assembly/2005/R/Pages/Votes.aspx?rcsnum=1508&votechamber=Senate (ac-
cessed December 9, 2012).  The Arkansas Senate has thirty-five members.
70. Bill Status History, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2005/R/Pages/BillStatus
History.aspx?measureno=HB1766 (accessed December 9, 2012).
71. Id.
2013] CAVEAT WHO? 1059
injury, or property damage proximately caused by any defect 
or disrepair on the premises absent the landlord’s:
(1) Agreement supported by consideration or as-
sumption by conduct of a duty to undertake an ob-
ligation to maintain or repair the leased premises; 
and
(2) Failure to perform the agreement or assumed 
duty in a reasonable manner.72
Given the strong legislative response, the common law incarnation of 
the caveat lessee doctrine appears to be firmly set in Arkansas. It also ap-
pears to have the strong support of the General Assembly. Given the present 
codification of the common law doctrine, the question becomes what, if any, 
of the exceptions to the caveat lessee doctrine adopted in other states might 
have some foothold in Arkansas case law. 
III. THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE CAVEAT LESSEE DOCTRINE
A. The Four Traditional Exceptions
There are four traditional exceptions to the caveat lessee doctrine that 
have developed in the common law of many states:  (1) a hidden danger in 
the premises of which the landlord, but not the tenant, was aware (i.e., the
latent defect exception); (2) premises leased for public use; (3) common 
areas retained under the landlord’s control (i.e., the retention of control ex-
ception); or (4) premises negligently repaired by the landlord.73 All four of 
these have not been addressed, at least expressly, in Arkansas decisions.  
The following subsections will discuss the application of these exceptions in 
other states and, to the extent possible, the Arkansas approach to the same.
1. The Latent Defect Exception
One of the traditional exceptions to the caveat lessee doctrine is hidden 
dangers known to the landlord.74 This exception abrogates the caveat lessee
doctrine in cases where the landlord fraudulently concealed facts about the 
premises or failed to disclose latent defects that could not be discovered 
through a reasonable inspection.75 The exception does not require the land-
72. ARK. Code Ann. § 18-16-110.
73. Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark. 623, 627, 932 S.W.2d 766, 768 (1996).  See also Milli-
gan v. Chesterfield Vill. GP, LLC, 239 S.W.3d 613, 629 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
74. Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 531 (1973).
75. Murray, supra note 5, at 153.
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lord to conduct inspections or even to make repairs—just to disclose what is 
known to the landlord.76 The duty can be describe as one that requires to 
warn of “’hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls and the like’” but does not 
require “protecting from dangers so ‘open and obvious’ as to reasonably 
expect others to detect them for themselves.”77
As stated in an early case on this exception, “Where there are con-
cealed defects attended with danger to an occupant, and which a careful 
examination would not discover, known to the lessor, the latter is bound to 
reveal them, in order that the lessee may guard against them. While the fail-
ure to reveal such facts may not be actual fraud or misrepresentation, it is 
such negligence as may lay the foundation of an action against the lessor, if 
injury occurs.”78
Arkansas case law is not completely clear on the latent defect excep-
tion. In the Propst case, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s 
latent defect claim but said, “Without the need of discussing whether the 
latent-defect exception has ever been recognized by Arkansas courts, we 
believe that, even if it had, Propst’s evidence on this issue is sorely lack-
ing.”79 In an early case, however, the Supreme Court of Arkansas articulated 
the caveat lessee doctrine as being, “[I]n the absence of fraud or conceal-
ment, the tenant leases at his peril, and the rule in the nature of caveat emp-
tor throws upon the lessee the responsibility of examining the demised 
premises for defects and providing against their consequences before he 
enters into the lease.”80 Arkansas courts have since copied this language in 
other decisions as being the embodiment of the doctrine in Arkansas.81
This definition would seem to imply the existence of the latent defect 
exception in Arkansas though cases typically do not hold the landlord liable 
for defects unknown by either party. 82 At least in part, this may be because 
of how strongly Arkansas holds to the portion of the caveat lessee doctrine 
that provides that a landlord has no duty to repair or maintain the leased 
premises absent a contract between the parties to obligate the landlord for 
the repair or maintenance.83 As stated in one case, “At common law the les-
76. Browder, supra note 28, at 103–04.
77. Miller v. David Grace, Inc., 212 P.3d 1223, 1231 (Okla. 2009).
78. Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 364 (Mass. 1887). See also Sunasack v. Mo-
rey, 196 Ill. 569, 571 (Ill. 1902).
79. Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark. 623, 627, 932 S.W.2d 766, 769 (1996).
80. Little Rock Ice Co. v. Consumers’ Ice Co., 114 Ark. 532, 532, 170 S.W. 241, 243 
(1914) (citing Watson v. Almirall, 61 App. Div. 429 (N.Y. 1901)).  
81. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rob Roy Plantation Co., 208 Ark. 429, 432, 186 S.W.2d 661, 
662 (1945).
82. See, e.g., Haizlip v. Rosenberg, 63 Ark. 430, 430, 39 S.W. 60, 60 (1897) (holding a 
landlord was not liable for water damage caused by a defective toilet).
83. Steward v. McDonald, 330 Ark. 837, 841, 958 S.W.2d 297, 299 (1997); Stalter v. 
Akers, 303 Ark. 603, 605, 798 S.W.2d 428, 430 (1990).
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sor owed no duty of repair of the premises to the lessee. Arkansas law fol-
lows this rule.”84
If the contract between the landlord and the tenant does not expressly 
impose a duty to repair or maintain on the landlord, then no such duty ex-
ists.85 This idea seems to hold whether the defect is latent or patent in nature, 
though not necessarily where the landlord fraudulently conceals a fact 
known to it.  For instance, in Miller v. Centerpoint Energy Resource Corp.,
the court found no duty to maintain an uncapped gas valve that led to an 
explosion since the lease agreement contained no provision for repairs, in-
cluding repairs to the gas line or space heater.86 Even if there is a latent de-
fect exception in Arkansas, a tenant clearly cannot impose liability on a 
landlord because of a defect which was discoverable “by a reasonably care-
ful examination” prior to entering into the lease agreement.87
2. Premises Leased for Public Use
Another of the traditional exceptions to the caveat lessee doctrine is for
premises leased for public use.88 This exception exposes the landlord to lia-
bility despite the caveat lessee doctrine when the lease of the premises is for 
“a purpose involving admission of the public.”89 The rationale for this ex-
ception is that the landlord has responsibility to the public when the premis-
es are leased for a purpose involving admission of the public and the land-
lord has reason to expect that the tenant will admit the public before the 
premises is put in a reasonably safe condition for the public.90 Under this 
exception, the landlord has a duty to fix a dangerous condition on the prem-
ises if the landlord knows that the premises will be for public use.91 The 
exception is not limited to leases to the government, but applies to any 
84. Hurst v. Feild, 281 Ark. 106, 108, 661 S.W.2d 393, 394 (1983).
85. Stalter, 303 Ark. at 606, 798 S.W.2d at 430.
86. Miller v. Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp., 98 Ark. App. 102, 110, 250 S.W.3d 574, 
580 (2007).
87. Little Rock Ice Co. v. Consumers’ Ice Co., 114 Ark. 532, 532, 170 S.W. 241, 243 
(1914).
88. Murray, supra note 5, at 155. See also Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 530 (1973).
89. Jones v. Levin, 2007 PA Super 412, 412, 940 A.2d 451, 456 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
See also Paglesdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 91 Wis. 2d 734, 741, 284 N.W.2d 55, 59 
(1979).
90. Id. at 412, 940 A.2d at 457. See also Hao v. Campbell Estate, 76 Haw. 77, 81, 869 
P.2d 216, 220 (1994).
91. Shoy v. Venator Group Specialty, Inc., No. CIV. 458/2000, 2002 WL 561063 (V.I. 
Mar. 26, 2002).
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premises, such as shopping centers, where members of the public might 
frequent.92
The exception “only extends to injuries suffered by members of the 
public and which occur in that portion of the premises intended to be open 
to the public.”93 The exception only applies for those persons admitted by 
the tenant for the purpose for which the land is held open.94 For example, a 
court in Kansas held that a plumber who came on the public premises for the 
purpose of preparing an estimate for plumbing work did not fall within the 
exception.95 In a Missouri case, the court found that a repairman working on 
a marquee was not a member of the public because he was conducting a 
business purpose at the time of the injury.96
Difficult questions in these cases involve determining what constitutes 
a public use or an area open to the public. A Washington court determined 
that a participant in a race who was injured on the race course did not quali-
fy for the exception because the race course was not open to members of the 
public, but only to the race participants.97 In a Connecticut case, the court 
determined that a back room of a public facility did not constitute an area 
open to the public.98 In a Pennsylvania case, the court determined that a side 
corridor of a lobby in a shopping center was a public use that was open to 
the public.99 In another Pennsylvania case, the court determined that the 
interior walkway of a baseball park during batting practice (as opposed to 
during a game) constituted a public place.100
Generally, an employee is not considered a member of the public for 
purposes of taking advantage of the public use exception.101 However, some 
jurisdictions, such as New York, extend the exception to employees but only 
so long as the injury occurs in an area that is open to the public and not just 
open to the employees of the tenant.102 For instance, in New York, an em-
ployee of a restaurant could not recover from the landlord when the injury 
92. See, e.g., Yarkosky v. Caldwell Store, Inc., 151 A.2d 839, 840 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959) 
(concerning the lease of a shopping center); Strade v. Ryan, 470 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708 (N.Y. 
1983) (concerning the lease of a restaurant).
93. Regan v. City of Seattle, 458 P.2d 12, 15 (Wash. 1969).
94. Rollo v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 857 F. Supp. 1441, 1444 (D. Kan. 1994).
95. Id.
96. Horstman v. Glatt, 436 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Mo. 1969).
97. Regan, 458 P.2d at 15.
98. Stevens v. Polinsky, 341 A.2d 25, 27 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974).
99. Yarkosky v. Caldwell Store, Inc., 151 A.2d 839, 841 (Pa. Super.Ct. 1959).
100. Jones v. Three Rivers Mgmt. Corp., 394 A.2d 546, 552 (Pa. 1978).
101. Jones v. Levin, 2007 PA Super. 412, 412, 940 A.2d 451, 458. See also Polinsky, 341 
A.2d at 27.
102. Brady v. Cocozzo, 570 N.Y.S.2d 748, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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occurred in the area of a cooler located off of the kitchen in the rear of the 
restaurant.103
There appears to be no case law in Arkansas directly discussing this 
exception. However, as discussed more fully in a later section, Arkansas has 
held that a third-party visitor may only seek recovery from the landlord for 
injuries caused by a defective condition if the landlord had a contractual 
obligation to the tenant to maintain or repair the premises.104 While not dis-
cussing a situation where the premises is intended to be open the public use, 
the strong indication from the existing case law is that Arkansas does not 
recognize the public use exception to the caveat lessee doctrine.
3. Common Areas Retained Under the Landlord’s Control
Another of the traditional exceptions to the caveat lessee doctrine ap-
plies to areas under the control of the landlord, often referred to as “common 
areas”.105 Common areas include structures such as exterior stairways, hall-
ways, parking lots, swimming pools, and other recreational areas.106 This 
exception requires a landlord to keep areas under its control in a reasonably 
safe condition.107 Cases may turn on whether an area, such as a stairway or 
lawn, is under the control of the landlord or the tenant.108 The exception typ-
ically holds the landlord to a negligence standard (as opposed to a strict lia-
bility standard), meaning that the landlord does not have to make the prem-
ises absolutely safe.109 Additionally, the exception typically requires the 
landlord to have knowledge or imputed knowledge from what a reasonable 
inspection would have revealed in order to impose liability on the landlord 
for damages suffered on the area retained under the landlord’s control.110
The general rule is that “a landlord is under no legal obligation to a 
tenant for injuries sustained in common areas, absent a statute or agree-
ment.”111 In the Propst case, the Court expressly stated that Arkansas does 
103. Strade v. Ryan, 470 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
104. Stalter v. Akers, 303 Ark. 603, 606, 798 S.W.2d 428, 430 (1990).
105. Murray, supra note 5, at 155. See also Sargent, supra note 49, at 531.
106. See, e.g., Arnold v. Walters, 224 P.2d 261, 262 (Okla. 1950).
107. Browder, supra note 28, at 102–03. See also Miller v. David Grace, Inc., 212 P.3d 
1223, 1228 (Okla. 2009).
108. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Tallmage, 365 N.W.2d 448, 449-50 (Neb. 1985) (holding that a 
stairway that serviced only one apartment did not fall under the common area exception); 
Tighe v. Cedar Lawn, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 520, 530 (Neb. App. 2002) (holding that a lawn for 
which the tenant had maintenance obligations did not fall under the common area exception).
109. Browder, supra note 28, at 103.
110. Id.
111. Boren v. Worthen Nat’l. Bank of Ark., 324 Ark. 416, 421, 921 S.W.2d 934, 938 
(1996).
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not recognize the retention of control exception.112 The Arkansas Supreme 
Court reaffirmed its rejection of the retention of control exception in the 
Eoff case, which had the twist that the injured party was a visitor on the 
premises.113 In Eoff v. Warden, Ms. Warden tripped over a concrete barrier 
in the parking lot of an apartment complex.114 She argued that the landlord 
had retained possession and control of the parking lot of the apartment com-
plex.115 Ms. Warden succeeded in convincing the trial court of the merits of 
her position but was reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court.116 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed the position that a landlord can only be 
held liable for injuries to tenants or visitors if the landlord was obligated to 
maintain the premises through “an express agreement or assumption of duty 
by conduct.”117
Arkansas also does not impose a duty on a landlord to remove hazards 
from common areas absent a contractual obligation to do so.118 Arkansas 
provides that “a landlord has no duty to a tenant to remove hazards from 
common areas unless such terms are spelled out in the lease. [emphasis in 
the original].”119 Absent a contractual obligation in the lease, Arkansas does 
not impose liability to the landlord for hazards in the common area even if 
the landlord undertakes to maintain the common areas.120 Arkansas imposes 
no duty on a landlord to remove natural hazards, such as snow or ice accu-
mulations that could threaten the well-being of tenants.121 Arkansas holds to 
the rationale that:
[A] duty to remove snow and ice from common passageways would sub-
ject the landlord to an unreasonable burden of vigilance and care and a 
landlord should not be responsible for such temporary natural hazards as 
the expected acts of nature over which he has no control and it would be 
unreasonable to require the landlord to be subjected to the duty of keep-
ing a janitor on the premises at all times merely to insure the immediate 
removal of snow and ice.”122
112. Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark. 623, 628, 932 S.W.2d 766, 769 (1996).
113. Eoff v. Warden, 330 Ark. 244, 244, 953 S.W.2d 880, 881 (1997).
114. Id., 953 S.W.2d at 881.
115. Id., 953 S.W.2d at 881.
116. Id., 953 S.W.2d at 881.
117. Id., 953 S.W.2d at 881.
118. Wheeler v. Phillips Dev. Corp., 329 Ark. 354, 357, 947 SW.2d 380, 382 (1997).
119. Id. This concept is somewhat muddled by Propst where the Arkansas Supreme Court 
stated “that assumption of duty by conduct can remove a landlord from the general rule of 
non-liability.” Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark. 623, 628, 932 S.W.2d 766, 769 (1996).
120. Wheeler, 329 Ark. at 357, 947 SW.2d at 382.
121. Kilbury v. McConnell, 246 Ark. 528, 530, 438 S.W.2d 692, 693 (1969).
122. Id., 438 S.W.2d at 693.
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In the case of Kilbury v. McConnell, the plaintiff urged the Arkansas 
Supreme Court to abandon this approach and adopt a rule established in
some jurisdictions that imposes a duty of reasonable care upon a landlord 
for common areas when a landlord has “notice, actual or constructive,” of a 
hazard and a reasonable opportunity to correct it.123 The court stated that the 
plaintiff “ably and forcefully argues that we should adopt the Connecticut 
rule [which imposes liability in such instances] which he contends is the 
more modern and enlightened approach to this issue.”124 The Court 
acknowledged that “[m]any courts have found favor with this rule.”125
However, the Court determined that the arguments for a change in the rule 
did not justify the imposition of this obligation on landlords.126
Just because a landlord creates rules regarding the use of common are-
as does not impose a duty on the landlord to protect the tenant from unsafe 
conditions related to the common areas that are the subject of the rules.127 In 
Glasgow v. Century Property Fund XIX, the tenant slipped on ice resulting 
from the landlord’s failure to close a hot tub area at the apartment complex
while snow was on the ground.128 The tenant asserted, unsuccessfully, that 
the landlord had liability because the landlord created rules regarding the 
use of the hot tub.129 However, the court found that merely creating rules 
governing the use of the common areas did not equate to assuming liability 
for the common area features.130
4. Premises Negligently Repaired by the Landlord
Many states have carved out an exception to the caveat lessee doctrine 
when the landlord negligently makes repairs or improvements.131 Under this 
exception, a landlord may be liable for damages when the landlord agrees to 
make repairs but does so in a negligent manner.132 As one court said, “A 
botched voluntary repair by the landlord constitutes an affirmative act of 
negligence.”133
123. Id., 438 S.W.2d at 693.
124. Id., 438 S.W.2d at 693.
125. Id., 438 S.W.2d at 693.
126. Id., 438 S.W.2d at 693.
127. Glasgow v. Century Prop. Fund XIX, 299 Ark. 221, 222, 772 S.W.2d 312, 313 
(1989).
128. Id., 772 S.W.2d at 313.
129. Id., 772 S.W.2d at 313.
130. Id., 772 S.W.2d at 313.
131. Miller v. David Grace, Inc., 212 P.3d 1223, 1228. See also Taylor v. Schukei Family 
Trust ex rel. Schukei, 996 P.2d 13, 16 (Wyo. 2000); Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 531; 
Hunkins v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 86 N.H. 356, 356 (N.H. 1933).
132. Hodge v. Nor-Cen, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 1157, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
133. Lian v. Stalick, 106 Wash. App. 811, 821, 25 P.3d 467, 474 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
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In some jurisdictions, a landlord may not be liable under this exception 
if the repair was made gratuitously, that is to say without an obligation un-
der the lease agreement to make the repair.134 In other jurisdictions, a land-
lord may be liable for a gratuitous repair that is done in a grossly negligent 
manner.135 In yet other jurisdictions, a landlord may be held to an ordinary 
negligence standard even for gratuitous repairs.136 Generally, a written obli-
gation is needed to make a repair anything but gratuitous, but at least one 
jurisdiction has found that an oral lease agreement can establish a duty on 
the landlord to make repairs that would be subject to this exception.137
Arkansas recognizes this exception to the caveat lessee doctrine.138 As 
the Arkansas Supreme Court said, 
[t]he law appears to be settled that, notwithstanding the landlord is under 
no implied obligation to make repairs or improvements upon leased 
premises, in the absence of a covenant or agreement to do so, still, if he 
undertakes to make such improvement or repairs, and makes them in 
such a negligent and careless manner as to injure the tenant, the tenant 
may recover damages therefor.”139
As stated more recently by the Arkansas Supreme Court, “Our law in 
this regard is well settled that when a landlord undertakes to repair the prem-
ises, the landlord is liable for any negligence in making those repairs.”140
Whether repair work by a landlord was negligently performed is a question 
for a jury.141
The landlord’s liability for repairs under Arkansas law is discussed 
more thoroughly in a more comprehensive section below.
B. The Implied Warranty of Habitability 
In addition to the four traditional common law exceptions to the caveat 
lessee doctrine, some jurisdictions have created other exceptions. One of the 
most widespread and earliest additional exceptions is the implied warranty 
of habitability for residential leases.142 This implied warranty abrogates the 
134. Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge Int’l Order of Odd Fellows, 526 P.2d 52, 58 (Wyo. 
1974).
135. Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Mass. 1980).
136. Buck v. Miller, 181 P.2d 264, 267 (Okla. 1947).
137. Taylor v. Schukei Family Trust ex rel. Schukei, 996 P.2d 13, 16 (Wyo. 2000).
138. Sparks v. Murray, 120 Ark. 17, 17, 178 S.W. 909, 910 (1915).
139. Id., 178 S.W. at 910.
140. Barnes, Quinn, Flake, & Anderson, Inc. v. Rankins, 312 Ark. 240, 244, 848 S.W.2d 
924, 926 (1993).
141. Id.
142. Murray, supra note 5, at 152.
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common law rule “that one who lets an unfurnished building to be occupied 
as a dwelling house does not impliedly agree that it is fit for habitation.”143
The justification for this exception is the belief “that tenants expect 
habitable premises when they enter into residential leases.”144 The exception 
removes from the tenant the responsibility for “examining property and ex-
tracting express warranties from the landlord.”145 The implied warranty of 
habitability assumes that a residential tenant may take property without ade-
quate opportunity to inspect the premises or without conducting an investi-
gation.146 Some courts found this principle may be truer in short-term lease 
agreements where the tenant may be more inclined to assume that the prem-
ises are intended for immediate occupancy, thus allowing no time for in-
spection.147 Some courts also found that furnished dwellings were harder to 
inspect and therefore had to have an implied warranty of habitability.148
Some courts also justified an implied warranty of habitability on the belief 
that residential tenants had no bargaining power with landlords to bargain 
for an express warranty of habitability.149 According to one observer, “The 
vast majority of jurisdictions now have an implied warranty of habitability 
either by statute or judicial decision.”150 The most common version of a stat-
utorily imposed warranty of habitability comes from the Uniform Residen-
tial Landlord Tenant Act (the “URLTA”), which has been enacted in twen-
ty-one states.151 Section 2.104 of the URLTA imposes a duty on the landlord 
to “make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the prem-
ises in a fit and habitable condition.”152
One of the first cases to recognize an implied warranty of habitability 
was Lemle v. Breeden. In what was a case of first impression for the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii, the tenant sued the landlord to recover the deposit 
and rent in the amount of $1,190.00.153 The tenant leased the house after an 
inspection during the daytime,154 but after moving into the house, the tenant 
143. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 349 (Neb. 1892).
144. Gilbert, supra note 5, at 251.
145. Id.
146. Murray, supra note 5, at 152.
147. Neisser, supra note 11, at 531.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Murray, supra note 5, at 160.
151. Legislative Fact Sheet—Residential Landlord and Tenant, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION,  http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Residential Landlord 
and Tenant Act (accessed August 23, 2013).
152. Id. Arkansas has not adopted the URLTA, although it has enacted all of the pro-
landlord provisions of the URLTA. 
153. Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d, 470, 471 (Haw. 1969).
154. Id.
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discovered the house was infested with rats that came out during the night.155
The tenant vacated the house after three days and demanded a refund from 
the landlord.156
The Hawaii trial court ruled for the tenant, finding both constructive 
eviction and an implied warranty of habitability.157 On appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii, the Court was careful to make a clear distinction 
between these two theories, noting that “[t]he origin, history, and theoretical 
justification for these legal doctrines are quite different and are not to be 
confused.”158 The Court examined the doctrine of implied warranties of fit-
ness and merchantability in the context of the sale of chattels.159 The court 
found the justification for these doctrines in the context of the sale of chat-
tels to be “(1) that the public interest in safety and consumer protection re-
quires it, and (2) that the burden ought to be shifted to the manufacturer 
who, by placing the goods on the market, represents their suitability and 
fitness.”160 The court found that these concepts had been extended in other 
states to the sale of new homes.161 The court decided that “a lease is, in es-
sence, a sale as well as a transfer of an estate in land and is, more important-
ly, a contractual relationship.”162 The court held “that in the lease of a dwell-
ing house, such as in this case, there is an implied warranty of habitability 
and fitness for the use intended.”163
The case of Javins v. First National Realty Corp., following a year af-
ter Lemle v. Breeden, popularized the concept of the implied warranty of 
habitability.164 In Javins, the United States Court of Appeals, District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, stated that “in the case of the modern apartment dweller, the 
value of the lease is that it gives him a place to live.”165 The court followed 
the same logic of the Lemle v. Breeden court, turning to an analysis of the 
law involving the sale of personal property.166 The court said, “Modern con-
tract law has recognized that the buyer of goods and services in an industri-
alized society must rely upon the skill and honesty of the supplier to assure 










164. Browder, supra note 28, at 103–104. A WestlawNext Search conducted on Decem-
ber 26, 2012 by Keyciting showed 738 citing references.
165. Javins v. First Natl. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
166. Id. at 1075.
167. Id.
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went on to analogize, “[t]hus without any special agreement a merchant will 
be held to warrant that his goods are fit for the ordinary purposes for which 
such goods are used and that they are at least of reasonably average quali-
ty.”168 The court found that implied warranties of quality have been extend-
ed beyond sales to include “renting a chattel, paying for services, or buying 
a combination of goods and services.”169 The court concluded that an im-
plied covenant of habitability applies to residential housing in the District of 
Columbia.170
Arkansas does not recognize an implied warranty of habitability. Ar-
kansas’s jurisprudence strongly disfavors implied covenants of any kind.171
As the Arkansas Supreme Court said, implied covenants “are not favored by 
the law and can be justified only upon the ground of legal necessity arising 
from the terms of the contract and the circumstances attending its execu-
tion,”172 especially in the landlord-tenant context. This is not to say, howev-
er, that Arkansas never recognizes implied covenants.  For instance, in the 
case of new home construction, Arkansas recognizes implied warranties of 
habitability, sound workmanship, and proper construction.173 Arkansas rec-
ognizes an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment in the context of leases.174
In the Bartley v. Sweetser case, the plaintiff argued for an implied war-
ranty of habitability.175 The Court in that case did not directly respond to the 
plaintiff’s argument regarding there being an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, but, in firmly dismissing the plaintiff’s case, the Court left little room to 
presume that Arkansas recognizes an implied warranty of habitability.176
C. Constructive Eviction
In the purest form of the caveat lessee doctrine, the tenant is responsi-
ble for paying rent under all circumstances except for the actual eviction of 
the tenant due to the failure of the landlord to deliver quiet enjoyment of the 
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1080.
171. See generally William L. Patton, Jr. Family Ltd. P’ship, L.L.L.P. v. Simon Prop. 
Grp. Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 846, 848 (E.D. Ark. 2005); Blake v. Scott, 92 Ark. 46, 46, 121 
S.W. 1054, 1055 (1909); State v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 595, 1844 WL 443, 5 (1844). For 
more on implied covenants in Arkansas, see the author’s article Are You Trying to Imply 
Something?:Understanding the Various State Approaches to Implied Covenants of Continu-
ous Operation in Commercial Leases, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 427 (2009).
172. Amco Production Co. v. Ware, 269 Ark. 313, 320-21, 602 S.W.2d 620, 623 (1980).
173. Bullington v. Palangio, 345 Ark. 320, 328, 45 S.W.3d 834, 839 (2001).
174. Dupree v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 260 Ark. 673, 676, 543 S.W.2d 465, 
467 (1976); Picket v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 177, 199 (1885).
175. Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 119, 890 S.W.2d 250, 251 (1994).
176. Id.
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premises.177 Constructive eviction is a judicial construct that softens this 
approach to the tenant’s responsibility for rent by allowing for a termination 
of the rental obligations when the tenant can no longer practically occupy 
the premises through the fault of the landlord.178 As described by one court, 
“[a] ‘constructive eviction’ is an act which, although not amounting to an 
actual eviction, is done with the express or implied intention, and has the 
effect, of essentially interfering with the tenant’s beneficial enjoyment of the 
leased premises.”179 The same court went on to describe it by saying, “[i]t 
may constitute a constructive eviction if the landlord does nay wrongful act 
or is guilty of any default or neglect whereby the leased premises are ren-
dered unsafe, unfit, or unsuitable for occupancy in whole, or in substantial 
part, for the purposes for which they are leased.”180
The constructive eviction exception first emerged in the colorful case 
of Dyett v. Pendleton from 1826.181 The New York court summarized the 
facts in Dyett as follows:
[I]n February, 1820, from time to time, and at sundry times, the plaintiff 
[i.e., the landlord] introduced into the house, (two rooms upon the se-
cond floor and two rooms upon the third floor whereof had been leased 
to the defendant [i.e., the tenant],) divers [sic] lewd women or prosti-
tutes, and kept and detained them in the said house all night, for the pur-
pose of prostitution; that the said lewd women or prostitutes would fre-
quently enter the said house in the day time, and after staying all night, 
would leave the same by day-light in the morning; that the plaintiff 
sometimes introduced other men into the said premises, who, together 
with him, kept company with the same lewd women or prostitutes during 
the night; that on such occasions, the plaintiff and the said lewd women 
or prostitutes, being in company in certain parts of the said house, not in-
cluded in the lease to the defendant, but adjacent thereto, and in the oc-
cupation or use of the plaintiff, were accustomed to make a great deal of 
indecent noise and disturbance, the said women or prostitutes often 
screaming extravagantly, and so as to be heard throughout the house, and 
by the near neighbors, and frequently using obscene and vulgar language 
so loud as to be understood at a considerable distance; that such noise 
and riotous proceedings, being from time to time continued all night, 
greatly disturbed the rest of persons sleeping in other parts of the said 
house, and particularly in those parts thereof demised to the defendant; 
that the practices aforesaid were matters of conversation and reproach in 
177. Halifax Eng’g, Inc. v. Doyle, Inc., 23 Va. Cir. 466, 466 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1991).
178. Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d, 470, 473 (Haw. 1969).
179. Hankins v. Smith, 138 So. 494, 495 (Fla.1931).
180. Id.at 495-96.
181. John H. Watson, Constructive Eviction, 19 HARV. L. REV. 50-51 (1905) and Fred W. 
Bopp III, The Unwarranted Implication of a Warranty of Fitness in Commercial Leases—An 
Alternative Approach, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1988).
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the neighborhood, and were of a nature to draw, and did draw, odium 
and infamy upon the said house, as being a place of ill fame, so that it 
was no longer respectable for moral and decent persons to dwell or enter 
therein; that all the said immoral, indecent and unlawful practices and 
proceedings were by the procurement or with the permission and concur-
rence of the plaintiff; that the defendant, being a person of good and re-
spectable character, was compelled, by the repetition of the said indecent 
practices and proceedings, to leave the said premises, and did, for that 
cause, leave the same on or about the beginning of March, 1820, after 
which he did not return thereto, &c. [sic]182
The Court noted an uncited essay on the common law of rents by “Bar-
on Gilbert” which states that:
‘A rent is something given by way of retribution to the lessor, for the 
land demised by him to the tenant, and consequently the lessor’s title to 
the rent is founded upon this:  that the land demised, is enjoyed by the 
tenant during the term included in the contract; for the tenant can make 
no return of a thing he has not.  If therefore the tenant be deprived of the 
thing letten, the obligation to pay the rent ceases, because such obliga-
tion has its force only from the consideration, which was the enjoyment 
of the thing demised.’ [emphasis in the original]183
From this principal, the New York court determined that the tenant’s 
obligation to pay rent is abrogated if the acts of the landlord effectively ex-
pel the tenant from the premises.184 The Court also concluded that a partial 
eviction, if caused by the act of the landlord, still entitles the tenant to aban-
don the whole of the premises and cease paying the entire rent.185 The Court 
said, “If the lessor expel the tenant from a part only of the premises, the ten-
ant is discharged from the payment of the whole rent; and the reason for the 
rule why there shall be no apportionment of the rent in this case as well as in 
that of an eviction by a stranger, that it is the wrongful act of the lessor him-
self, ‘that no man may be encouraged to injure or disturb his tenant in his 
possession, whom, by the policy of the feudal law, he ought to protect and 
defend.’” (the case does not state the source of the quote though the context 
appears to indicate Baron Gilbert’s essay on rents)186 The Court went on to 
say, “[Being evicted from part of the premises] is such a disturbance, such 
an injury to its beneficial enjoyment, such a diminution of the consideration 
upon which the contract is founded, that the law refuses its aid to coerce the 
182. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727, 735-36 (N.Y. 1826).
183. Id. at 730.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 731.
186. Id.
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payment of any rent.”187 Though there was no physical eviction of the tenant 
from the premises in this case, the Court determined:
Here, then is a case, where actual entry and physical eviction are not 
necessary to exonerate the tenant from the payment of rent; and if the 
principle be correct as applied to a part of the premises, why should not 
the same principle equally apply to the whole property demised, where 
there has been an obstruction to its beneficial enjoyment, and a diminu-
tion of the consideration of the contract, by the acts of the landlord, alt-
hough those acts do not amount to a physical eviction?  If physical evic-
tion be not necessary in the one case, to discharge the rent of the part re-
tained, why should it be essential in the other, to discharge the rent of the 
whole? If I have not deceived myself, the distinction referred to settles 
and recognizes the principle for which the plaintiff in error contends, that 
there may be a constructive eviction produced by the acts of the land-
lord.188
In the wake of Dyett, courts across the country developed the doctrine 
of constructive eviction.189 Four basic requirements evolved:  “1) substantial 
interference with possession; 2) interference by or at the direction of the 
landlord; 3) that the landlord was notified of the problem; and 4) abandon-
ment of the property by the tenant within a reasonable time.”190 At first, the 
doctrine required the tenant to actually abandon the premises, though that 
requirement has changed in some jurisdictions.191 Some states have evolved 
this concept further to create a “duty to maintain” after the commencement 
of the lease, extending this concept to cover virtually any situation where the 
premises becomes untenable.192
Arkansas recognizes the doctrine of constructive eviction.193 As the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court said, “the failure on the part of the lessor to perform 
his covenants in the lease may justify the abandonment of the premises by 
the lessee, and may work a cessation of the rent.”194 Arkansas courts equate 
187. Id.
188. Dyett, 8 Cow. at 731.
189. Murray, supra note 5, at 151. See, e.g., Halifax Eng’g. Inc. v. Doyle, Inc., 23 Va. 
Cir. 466, 466 (1991) (stating that at common law the tenant may vacate the premises and 
terminate the lease if the landlord breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment) (citing M.M. 
Rowe Co. v. Wallerstein, 133 S.E. 669 (Va. 1926); Buchanan v. Orange, 88 S.E. 52 (Va. 
1916)).
190. Murray, supra note 5, at 151.
191. Id.; see, e.g., Halifax Engineering, Inc. v. Doyle, Inc., 23 Va. Cir. 466, 466 (1991) 
(noting that a tenant may not remain in possession and withhold rental payments).
192. Murray, supra note 5, at 154–55.
193. Fletcher v. Joseph Pfeifer Clothing Co., 103 Ark. 318, 318, 146 S.W. 864, 866 
(1912).
194. Tedstrom v. Puddephat, 99 Ark. 193, 193, 137 S.W. 816, 818 (1911) (citing Young 
v. Berman, 96 Ark. 78, 131 S.W. 62 (1910)); see also Berman v. Shelby, 93 Ark. 472, 478, 
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the concept of constructive eviction with a breach of the landlord’s obliga-
tion to provide quiet enjoyment.195 As stated by the Arkansas Supreme 
Court, “[t]he concepts of constructive eviction and breach of the covenant 
for quiet enjoyment are very closely related, if not just different names for 
the same concept.”196 In the absence of language in the lease agreement to 
the contrary, Arkansas law implies a covenant of quiet enjoyment in all 
leases.197
The Arkansas Court of Appeals recently summarized Arkansas’ con-
cept of constructive eviction as follows:
Conduct by a landlord that effectively deprives the tenant of the use and 
benefit of the premises amounts to a constructive eviction.  What par-
ticular acts or omissions by the landlord amount to a constructive evic-
tion cannot be defined by a general rule and depend on the facts of each 
case.  The landlord’s conduct must be such that it will prevent the ten-
ant’s use of the premises for the particular purposes for which it was 
leased.  Constructive eviction depends on the materiality of the depriva-
tion.  Similarly, the concept of first breach recognizes that a breach of a 
lease by one contracting party may release the other party from its con-
tractual duties if the first breach is material and sufficiently serious.  In 
particular, if a landlord breaches his contract to repair or make improve-
ments, the tenant may treat the relations at an end.198
In Fairpark, LLC v. Healthcare Essentials, even though there was con-
flicting evidence, the trial court ruled in favor of the tenant, finding that it 
was constructively evicted because the air conditioning system, which the 
landlord was contractually obligated to maintain, did not function properly 
and caused the tenant “severe discomfort and disruption in their work.”199 In 
300 Spring Building v. Matthews, the court found constructive eviction 
when the landlord, in contravention of the services the landlord promised to 
furnish in the lease agreement, failed “to furnish water fit for human con-
sumption, heating and air conditioning creating a normal environment, and 
janitorial services commensurate with the use of the premises.”200 The ten-
125 S.W. 124, 126 (1910) (holding that failure of a landlord to comply with the terms of a 
lease justifies releasing the tenants and their personal guarantor, from the lease terms).
195. Trace X Chem. Inc. v. Highland Res., Inc., 265 Ark. 468, 473, 579 S.W.2d 89, 92 
(1979).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 475, 579 S.W.2d at 93 (citing Dupree v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 260 Ark. 
673, 675, 543 S.W.2d 465, 466 (1976)).
198. Fairpark, LLC v. Healthcare Essentials, 2011 Ark. App. 146, at 9, 381 S.W.3d 852, 
857 (internal citations omitted).
199. Id.
200. 300 Spring Bldg. v. Matthews, No. CA 89-211, 1990 WL 16721, at 3 (Ark. Ct. App. 
Feb. 21, 1990).
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ant must abandon the premises to have a valid claim for constructive evic-
tion.201
Courts have defined “eviction” as “interfering with the tenant’s enjoy-
ment of the premises.”202 The extent of the eviction can be an issue in de-
termining whether a tenant is actually constructively evicted by the landlord.  
As far back as 1880, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
With regard to eviction by the landlord himself, the result of all the Eng-
lish authorities is, that if it be of any material part of the demised premis-
es, and not a mere trespass, it suspends the rent during the eviction, for 
the whole.  It is placed upon the ground of the landlord’s wrong, in the 
violation by him of the duty, which springs from the relation, to protect 
the tenant in his quiet enjoyment of the whole. … A trespass is not an 
eviction in all cases.  … Besides, an eviction depends on the materiality 
of the deprivation.  If trifling and producing no inconvenience, it should 
not be regarded.  It depends on circumstances.  Twenty inches might be a 
great deal in the crowded streets of a city, but wholly insignificant in the 
boundary of a Texas ranche [sic].203
Even though Arkansas recognizes the concept of constructive eviction, 
it is limited to situations where the act of the landlord (or that of someone 
with superior title to the landlord) creates the eviction.204 Arkansas courts 
have not found constructive eviction when the eviction is caused by external 
factors, such as forces of nature.205 For instance, in Rogers v. Rob Roy Plan-
tation Co., the tenant leased the property for hay production but could not 
harvest because the land flooded.206 Despite the flood that destroyed the hay, 
the tenant was still obligated to pay the rent and could not claim constructive 
eviction.207
D. Suitability of Purpose (a/k/a Implied Warranty of Fitness)
Since part of the rationale supporting the caveat lessee doctrine is the 
idea that tenants can inspect the premises before signing the lease, some 
states have implied a covenant of suitability of purpose when a building is 
under construction or incomplete at the time of the lease.208 In other words, 
201. Trace X Chem., 265 Ark. at 476–78, 579 S.W.2d at 93–94.
202. Burdan v. Walton, 286 Ark. 98, 100, 689 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1985) (citing Fletcher v. 
Joseph Clothing Co., 103 Ark. 318, 146 S.W. 864 (1912)).
203. Collins v. Karatopsky, 36 Ark. 316, 329–32 (1880).
204. See Rogers v. Rob Roy Plantation Co., 208 Ark. 429, 431, 186 S.W.2d 661, 661-62
(1945).
205. See id.
206. Id. at 431, 186 S.W.2d at 661.
207. Id. at 431–32, 186 S.W.2d at 662.
208. Murray, supra note 5, at 153.
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if it is not possible to inspect the premises, then the landlord has an obliga-
tion to deliver the premises in a condition that is fit for the intended use of 
the premises under the lease agreement. As explained by one court:
[T]here is a distinct difference between property in existence at the time 
of the execution of the lease, which the lessee has an opportunity to in-
spect and use his own judgment as to its fitness or adequacy for the pur-
poses intended, and property or appliances which are either to be built or 
installed subsequent to the execution of the lease, and of which the lessee 
of course has no opportunity to inspect.”209
The caveat lessee doctrine still applies if the building is sufficiently 
complete to permit inspection.210 However, the parties can contract in the 
lease agreement to negate or modify the implied warranty of fitness.211
At least one case indicates that Arkansas may recognize an implied 
warranty of fitness for the intended use when the lease is entered into before 
the building is substantially complete.212 This is consistent with the common 
law justification for the caveat lessee doctrine that a tenant has an oppor-
tunity to inspect the premises prior to entering into the lease.  It is impossi-
ble to satisfy the justification if there is no opportunity for the tenant to in-
spect the premises because the premises are not complete at the time the
parties enter into the lease. However, if the building is close enough to com-
plete at the time of the lease that it is possible to inspect the premises, then 
the caveat lessee rule still holds.213
E. Tort-Style Liability
Some states have abandoned the caveat lessee doctrine altogether and 
switched to a tort-style negligence standard.214 Most states that have gone 
this direction have applied a negligence standard to determine the landlord’s 
liability.215 For instance, Wyoming imposes a duty of reasonable care under 
209. Woolford v. Elec. Appliances, 75 P.2d 112, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938); see also 
Levitz Furniture Co. of E. Region, Inc. v. Cont’l Equities, Inc., 411 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
210. J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (citing 
Oliver v. Hartzell, 170 Ark. 512, 515, 280 S.W. 979, 981 (1926)), rev’d on other grounds, 66 
S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933).
211. Levitz Furniture Co., 411 So.2d at 223.
212. Oliver, 170 Ark. At 515, 280 S.W. 979, 980–81.
213. Id., 280 S.W. at 980–81 (1926) (holding there was no implied warranty of fitness 
even when the premises was repeatedly flooding because the tenant had the opportunity to 
inspect the premises before signing the lease).
214. Powers, supra note 5, at 366; see also Neisser, supra note 11, at 527.  
215. Neisser, supra note 11, at 527–28.
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the circumstances.216 However, in some situations, some states have im-
posed strict liability on landlords.217 For instance, New Jersey has estab-
lished strict liability against landlords for injuries resulting from inadequate 
security.218 At least in Massachusetts, which has switched completely to tort-
style liability for leases, there has been an abandonment altogether of the 
idea that a lease is a conveyance of property.219
Recently, Oklahoma joined the group of states that have imposed tort-
style liability for residential leases.220 The Oklahoma Supreme Court said, 
“[T]oday this Court supplants the caveat emptor doctrine of landlord tort 
immunity. In its place, this Court imposes a general duty of care upon land-
lords to maintain the leased premises, including areas under the tenant’s 
exclusive control or use, in a reasonably safe condition.”221 The Court went 
on to say, “[t]his duty requires a landlord to act reasonably when the land-
lord knew or reasonably should have known of the defective condition and 
had a reasonable opportunity to make repairs.”222 The Court further said, 
“[t]he landlord’s knowledge is key in triggering the duty to maintain the 
leased premises in a reasonably safe condition.”223 The Court clarified that 
“[o]nly in the presence of a duty neglected or violated will a landlord’s neg-
ligence be actionable. By the same token, the landlord’s liability, as any 
other tortfeasor, may be reduced or absolved by the tenant’s contributory 
negligence.”224
Arkansas has not gone the direction of imposing tort principles to the
landlord-tenant relationship. As one commentator noted, there is an inherent 
difficulty in applying tort principles to the landlord-tenant relationship be-
cause “[t]ort law has always had trouble accommodating the distinction be-
tween misfeasance and nonfeasance.”225 Since principal control of the prem-
ises is in the hands of tenant, the landlord’s alleged liability typically rests in 
nonfeasance, rather than misfeasance, almost setting up a strict liability 
standard for landlords when tort principals are applied.226
216. Merrill v. Jansma, 86 P.3d 270, 287 (Wyo. 2004).
217. Neisser, supra note 11, at 527–28.
218. Id. at 528; see also Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 445 (N.J. 1980).
219. See Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (Mass. 1980).





225. Browder, supra note 28, at 101.
226. Id. at 102.
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LANDLORD AND THE TENANT IN 
ARKANSAS
In Arkansas, a tenant is not considered an invitee of the landlord even 
though the tenant’s presence on the premises contributes to the pecuniary 
gain of the landlord.227 “A tenant is not an invitee on her landlord’s premises 
but has a right equal to that of the landlord to exclusive possession of the 
property.”228 This exclusive right means that the tenant “occupies a position 
on a parity with that of an owner and precisely opposite to that of an in-
vitee.”229 As the Arkansas Supreme Court said, “The duties owed by a land-
lord to his tenant are determined by principles quite different from those 
applicable to the owners or occupiers of land and their invitees.”230
Furthermore, an employee of a tenant is not an invitee of the land-
lord.231 A landlord does not have any duty to see that the premises leased by 
a tenant are safe for the tenant’s employees.232 However, a prospective ten-
ant is an invitee of a landlord, and the landlord may be liable for harm to the 
prospective tenant who is “inspecting premises with a view to renting 
them.”233
Arkansas law does not impose a higher obligation or duty on the land-
lord even when the landlord knows that the tenant has a special status.234
For instance, in Wheeler v. Phillips Development Corp., the Arkansas Su-
preme Court did not impose a higher obligation or duty on the landlord even 
though the landlord knew that the apartment complex was leased primarily 
to “elderly, handicapped, and disabled persons.”235
Even under the caveat lessee doctrine, the landlord still owes certain 
duties of fair dealing to the tenant as illustrated by the case of Gurlen v. 
Henry Management, Inc. In Gurlen, the landlord of an apartment complex 
227. Wheeler v. Phillips Development Corp., 329 Ark. 354, 356, 947 SW.2d 380, 382 
(1997).
228. Id.; see also Glasgow v. Century Property Fund XIX, 299 Ark. 221, 222, 772 
S.W.2d 312, 312 (1989). At least since the adoption of the Arkansas Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act of 2007, the tenant’s possessory rights are subject to the rights of the landlord to 
enter the premises. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-602.
229. Knox v. Gray, 289 Ark. 507, 508, 712 S.W.2d 914, 915 (1986).
230. Id., 712 S.W.2d at 915.
231. Lacy v. Flake & Kelley Management, Inc., 366 Ark. 365, 370, 235 S.W.3d 894, 898 
(2006) (citing Wheeler v. Phillips Development Corp., 329 Ark. 354, 947 S.W.2d 380 
(1997)).
232. Id.
233. Knox, 289 Ark. At 508, 712 S.W.2d at 915.
234. See Wheeler v. Phillips Development Corp., 329 Ark. 354, 355, 947 SW.2d 380, 381 
(1997).
235. Id., 947 SW.2d at 381.
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offered the tenant space in an on-site storage facility.236 The landlord pro-
vided the storage space for free while deciding how much to charge for the 
space.237 The tenant moved her property into two of the storage bins and 
used her own padlocks.238 However, the tenant did not notify the landlord as 
to which bins she selected.239 After the landlord decided to start charging for 
the storage bins, the landlord posted notices in the apartment complex tell-
ing residents to see management about the continued use of the storage 
bins.240 The tenant claimed that she never saw the signs.241 The landlord 
hired a contractor to go through the bins and dispose of any unclaimed 
items, which included the tenant’s items.242 The landlord did not attempt to 
directly contact the tenant beforehand even though the landlord knew that 
the tenant was using the bins.243 The landlord relied on the following lan-
guage in the lease agreement:
All personal property placed in the leased premises, or in the storerooms 
or in any portion of said premises or any place appurtenant thereto, shall 
be at risk of the Resident, or the parties owning [sic] the same and Lessor 
shall in no event be liable for the loss, theft or damage to such property 
or for any act or negligence of any co-resident or servants of the Resi-
dents or occupants, or of any other person v soever [sic] in or about the 
premises.244
The court viewed the language in the lease as creating an exculpatory 
contract, for which there is “strong disfavor” in the law.245 Exculpatory 
clauses must very clearly describe the covered act since they are construed 
as narrowly as possible by the courts.246 The Arkansas Court of Appeals 
found, “While the language of the lease places the risk of loss, theft, or 
damage to property in the storerooms on the tenant, nothing is said in the 
lease agreement about intentional actions taken by [the landlord].”247 The 
Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment in favor of the landlord 
and remanded the case for a determination of the tenant’s damages.248







242. Gurlen, 2010 Ark. App. at *2, 2010 WL 5132526, at *2.
243. Id.
244. Id. at *4.
245. Id. at *5.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Gurlen, 2010 Ark. App. at *2, 2010 WL 5132526, at *2.
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Furthermore, the caveat lessee doctrine does not give the landlord li-
cense to violate the law. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that land-
lords cannot use force to retake leased premises, even when the tenant de-
faults.249 Arkansas law prohibits self-help action and requires the landlord to 
use legal process to evict a tenant, even if the lease agreement provides oth-
erwise.250 Lease terms purporting to give the landlord self-help remedies are 
invalid.251
V. ISSUES RELATED TO A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE 
PREMISES
Arkansas does not impose an implied obligation for a landlord to main-
tain the leased premises.252 However, the caveat lessee doctrine does not 
protect a landlord from performing maintenance obligations that the land-
lord contracts to perform in the lease agreement. Many lease agreements 
impose some express maintenance obligation on the landlord. This section 
will discuss some of the Arkansas cases interpreting express maintenance 
obligations. Of course, even small wording differences in lease agreements 
can create different results as most of the cases discussed in this section 
were determined by the facts and circumstances unique to such case.
Also, an obligation to repair cannot be implied from local custom.253
As the Arkansas Supreme Court said, “A local custom cannot be shown in 
order to render the landlord liable for failure to make repairs in contraven-
tion of the above well-established rule [i.e., that unless a landlord agrees 
with his tenant to repair leased premises, he cannot, in the absence of a stat-
ute be compelled to do so].”254
The measure of damages for a landlord’s failure to fulfill its obligation 
to provide maintenance are “compensatory only; that is, such damages as 
result directly from the breach and which would make good the actual loss 
caused thereby.”255 The tenant has an obligation to mitigate damages in such 
instances.256 This measure of damages is not the same as it is in all states 
with the Arkansas Supreme Court noting, “In some courts it has been held 
that he may recover all damages which may result from such breach; in oth-
249. Gorman v. Ratliff, 289 Ark. 332, 337, 712 S.W.2d 888, 890 (1986).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 891.
252. Rundell v. Rogers, 144 Ark. 293, 293, 222 S.W. 19, 20 (1920).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Young v. Berman, 96 Ark. 78, 78, 131 S.W. 62, 64 (1910).
256. Id.
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ers, that the measure of the damages is the diminution in the rental value of 
the premises by reason of such breach.”257
A. A Gratuitous Promise to Repair
A gratuitous promise to repair by a landlord that is not supported by 
consideration is insufficient to impose a duty on the landlord to carry out the 
promise.258 In the Stalter case, a visitor to the premises had overheard an 
earlier conversation where the landlord promised the tenant that he would 
repair a broken step.259 The visitor, while leaving the premises in a hurry 
after an argument with the tenant, forgot about the broken step and broke 
her leg when she fell.260 A jury awarded the visitor a $16,000 judgment, but 
the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the judgment.261 The lease agreement 
between the tenant and the landlord imposed no obligation on the landlord 
to repair or maintain the premises.262 Even though the landlord promised to 
repair the broken step, the promise was merely gratuitous and, therefore, 
unenforceable.263 The visitor could not meet the condition precedent to pur-
sue a liability claim against the landlord since the visitor could not prove the 
landlord had a contractual obligation to the tenant to repair the premises.264
In the Wheeler case, the landlord’s employee maintained the sidewalks 
around the apartment complex even though the lease agreement did not im-
pose such an obligation.265 After a tenant was injured by tripping over a rock 
on the sidewalk, the apartment manager testified that “it was her duty to 
manage the apartments and maintain the lawn, stating further that ‘I mow, 
weedeat, and then clean off the sidewalk.’”266 The facts in Wheeler were 
exacerbated by the fact that the tenant was blind and the apartment complex 
primarily served “elderly, handicapped, and disabled persons.”267 Neverthe-
less, as a matter of law, the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that no 
liability could attach to the landlord merely by maintaining the sidewalks 
absent a contractual obligation to do so.268
However, the Court softened the result in Stalter and Wheeler some-
what in the case of Thomas v. Stewart. In the Thomas case, the plaintiff’s 
257. Id.
258. Stalter v. Akers, 303 Ark. 603, 607, 798 S.W.2d 428, 430 (1990).
259. Id. at 604, 798 S.W.2d at 429.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 606, 798 S.W.2d at 430.
263. Id.
264. Stalter, 303 Ark. at 604, 798 S.W.2d at 429.
265. Wheeler v. Phillips Dev. Corp., 329 Ark. 354, 355, 947 SW.2d 380, 381 (1997).
266. Id.
267. Id. 329 Ark. at 355, 947 SW.2d at 381.
268. Id. at 367, 947 SW.2d at 382.
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son leaned against a defective second-floor balcony railing and suffered 
numerous injuries when he fell.269 A relative of the plaintiff had informed a
gentleman named Gordon Reese about the defective railing, and Mr. Reese 
reportedly agreed to fix the same.270 The record brought to the Court in the 
Thomas case was evidentially not a model of clarity because the Court could 
not discern whether Mr. Reese was the owner of the apartment complex or 
just an employee.271 The defendant relied on the Stalter case and countered 
that Mr. Reese’s promise was merely gratuitous.272 The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the landlord, but the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed and remanded.273 The Court felt that the plaintiff presented 
two issues for further consideration:  (1) whether Mr. Reese’s promise to 
repair the railing involved consideration because the plaintiff renewed its 
verbal, month-to-month lease; and (2) whether Mr. Reese had the authority 
to make a binding promise.274 The decision in Thomas weakened the deci-
sion in Stalter by exposing landlords to a jury on a question of fact when 
there is an alleged promise by the landlord to make a repair even when the 
lease imposes no such obligation.   
B. An Agreement to Repair Casualty Damage
Absent an agreement in the lease agreement, the landlord is not respon-
sible for making repairs or improvements to the premises on account of cas-
ualties or forces of nature.275 At common law, the tenant’s obligation to pay 
rent is not affected by the accidental destruction of the premises by fire or 
other casualty.276 However, some lease agreements contain an express obli-
gation for the landlord to repair damages caused by casualties, such as fires, 
floods or tornadoes or to relieve the tenant of an obligation to pay rent in 
such cases.277 For instance, in E. E. Terry, Inc. v. Cities of Helena and West 
Helena, the lease provided that the landlord would repair damages caused 
by “fire, windstorm or other unavoidable casualty.”278 The buildings leased 
to the tenant began to cave in and fall down.279 However, the court deter-
269. Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 36, 60 S.W.3d 415, 416 (2001).
270. Id. at 37, 60 S.W.3d at 417.
271. Id. at 42, 60 S.W.3d at 421.
272. Id. at 41, 60 S.W.3d at 420.
273. Id. at 42, 60 S.W.3d at 421.
274. Id.
275. Jones v. Felker, 72 Ark. 405, 405, 80 S.W. 1088, 1088 (1904) (holding the tenant to 
be responsible for rebuilding a fence even though rains caused the need for the rebuilding).  
276. Tedstrom v. Puddephat, 99 Ark. 193, 193, 137 S.W. 816, 819 (1911).
277. Id.
278. E. E. Terry, Inc. v. Cities of Helena and West Helena, 256 Ark. 236, 228, 506 
S.W.2d 573, 578 (1974).
279. Id. 256 Ark. at 236, 506 S.W.2d at 578.
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mined that the buildings were collapsing due to deterioration from old age 
rather than casualty.280 Deterioration from old age is not the same thing as a 
casualty such as fire or windstorm, so the landlord had assumed no obliga-
tion of repair in that instance.281 The Court examined a Maryland case that 
considered, as a matter of first impression, whether decay from old age can 
be considered the same thing as a casualty caused by an act of God.  In the 
Maryland case, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that acts of God are 
characterized by some “sudden, unusual, or unexpected action of the ele-
ments.”282 The Maryland court found that gradual decay, even from natural 
causes, does not qualify as an act of God.283
The Supreme Court of Arkansas also examined a Massachusetts case 
from 1849. In Bigelow v. Collamore,284 the landlord leased a water-driven 
mill to the tenant.285 The lease contained language that is very similar to 
language that still appears in many lease agreements today, providing 
[T]hat if the premises, or any part thereof, should be destroyed or dam-
aged, during the term, by fire or other unavoidable casualty, so as to be
rendered unfit for use and habitation, the rent reserved, or a part thereof, 
according to the nature and extent of the injury, should be suspended or 
abated, until the premises should be put in proper condition for use by 
the lessor.286
The lease provided that repairs would be made by the tenant during the 
term of the lease.287 The water-wheel frequently broke down and, upon ex-
amination, “was found to be so rotten, old, out of repair, and worn out, as to 
be almost worthless, and not worth repairing.”288 However, there was no 
evidence to show that the condition of the water-wheel was due to any spe-
cial cause, sudden event or accident.289 Consequently, the Massachusetts 
court found that the landlord was not responsible for the repair of the water-
wheel since the damage came from old-age, not from a casualty.290
In Little Rock Ice Co. v. Consumers’ Ice Co., the lease provided:
In the event of loss by fire or boiler explosion, the lessor shall elect with-
in a reasonable time, whether to repair damage, or cancel lease, and re-
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Kirby v. Wylie, 70 A. 213, 215 (Md. 1908).
283. Id. at 215.
284. 59 Mass. 226, 226 (1 Cush. 1849).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 226–27.
287. Id. at 228.
288. Id. at 227.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 230–231.
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turn notes for rent due, but rent shall continue until such election, and in 
event of election to rebuild, there shall be no rebate of any part of rent 
herein provided.  Said repairs are to be executed in a reasonable time.291
The tenant in Little Rock Ice Co. gave evidence that the boilers became 
so worn that they were likely to explode at any time.292 The tenant argued 
that the landlord was responsible for replacing the boilers based on the lan-
guage in the lease agreement since they were likely to explode at any 
time.293 However, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, after considering Kirby v. 
Wylie and Bigelow v. Collamore, found that ‘explosion’ “clearly refers to 
damage done to the boiler by a sudden bursting of it which could not be 
reasonably foreseen by human agencies, and does not signify a mere want of 
repair or natural decay or wearing out arising from lapse of time or improper 
use of the boilers.”294 The Court stated:
[t]he loss in capacity of the plant arose from the fact that the boilers, 
through decay and old age, became worn out.  As we have already seen, 
the lessee, having failed to provide against such a contingency, must suf-
fer the consequences of its neglect, and is liable for the rent accruing af-
ter the boilers became worn to such an extent that it was dangerous to 
use them.295
C. Ambiguous Maintenance Terms in a Lease Agreement
Cases often turn on the specific wording of the maintenance clause
when the lease contains one. Any ambiguities in a lease agreement are re-
solved against the party who prepared the lease.296 In Huber Rental Proper-
ties, LLC v. Allen, the Court found the following clause to impose liability 
on the landlord:
8. Maintenance:  Please make request for repairs or maintenance to Les-
sor between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday [. . .] In the event 
of an emergency, please contact the Lessor as soon as possible.  No 
charge is made for maintenance and repairs unless caused by negligence 
or abuse by the tenant, other residents or guests.297
The court found that the reference to the tenant being required to call 
the landlord for repairs and the landlord paying for the repairs imposed lia-
291. Little Rock Ice Co. v. Consumers’ Ice Co., 114 Ark. 532, 535, 170 S.W. 241, 242 
(1914).
292. Id. at 536, 170 S.W. at 242.
293. Id. at 539, 170 S.W. at 243.
294. Id. at 541, 170 S.W. at 244.
295. Id. at 542, 170 S.W. at 244.
296. Huber Rental Properties, LLC v. Allen, 2012 Ark. App. 642, __S.W.3d __, __.
297. Id. at 2, _S.W.3d at _.
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bility on the landlord for maintenance.298 However, the lease also provided 
that the tenant “shall ‘keep and maintain the premises in a clean and sanitary 
condition at all times.’”299 Nevertheless, the court did not find this require-
ment on the tenant to be enough to overcome the landlord’s general obliga-
tion to maintain the premises under the terms of the lease agreement.300
A question of fact exists if the terms of the lease agreement are ambig-
uous regarding the landlord’s duty.301 The language in the lease agreement 
may be ambiguous “when there is doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning or 
it is fairly susceptible of two interpretations.”302 In Denton v. Pennington,
the tenant leased space in a building that had a wooden deck.303 The tenant 
was injured when he stepped through a board on the wooden deck.304 The 
lease stated:
Lessor shall maintain the exterior walls, doors, and roof, exterior, interi-
or, plumbing, wiring, heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems of 
the structure upon the leased premises in a reasonable state of repair as 
may be required to keep and maintain the same in good and tenable con-
dition, to include changing furnace filters periodically so as to maintain 
heating and air conditioning units. [emphasis added by the court]305
The Court found that the word “exterior” was susceptible to more than 
one interpretation because it may or may not include the deck.306 Further-
more, the evidence established that the landlord had an employee who peri-
odically inspected the property, including the deck, sometimes driving in 
nails that she found protruding from the deck.307 The Court also found that a 
material question of fact exists when there are ambiguities of this nature, 
thus creating a jury question.308 However, this result could conflict with the 
decision in Wheeler v. Phillips Development Corp. where the Arkansas Su-
preme Court found summary judgment appropriate in a situation where the 




301. Tennell v. Midtown Apartments Ltd. P’ship., No. CA 06-127, 2006 WL 3307466, at 
*1 (Ark. App. 2006) (citing Elkins v. Arkla, Inc., 312 Ark. 280, 849 S.W.2d 489 (1003); 
Denton v. Pennington, 82 Ark. App. 179, 119 S.W.3d 519 (2003)).
302. Tennell, 2006 WL 3307466, at *1 (citing Denton, 82 Ark. App. At 179, 119 S.W.3d 
at 519). 
303. Denton v. Pennington, 82 Ark. App. 179, 181, 119 S.W.3d 519, 520 (2003).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 182, 119 S.W.3d at 521.
306. Id. at 183, 119 S.W.3d at 522.
307. Id. at 183–84, 119 S.W.3d at 522.
308. Id. at 183, 119 S.W.3d at 522.
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where the tenant tripped on a rock.309 The Arkansas Court of Appeals in 
Denton distinguished Wheeler based on the activities of the property man-
ager, which included driving nails back into the deck, sweeping the deck 
and cutting grass in and around the deck.310 The Court found that this activi-
ty combined with the ambiguous nature of the lease created a jury ques-
tion.311
In Tennell v. Midtown Apartments Limited P’ship., the tenant tripped 
over a steel plate in the parking lot and suffered injuries.312 In several places 
in the lease agreement, the lease used the term “dwelling unit” and the term 
“premises.”313 The lease contained the following provisions (emphasis added 
by the Court):
1. [Midtown] leases to [Tennell], and [Tennell] leases from [Midtown] 
dwelling unit in the project known as Mid Town Apartments, for a 
term…  
15. [Tennell] for [herself] and [her] heirs, executors and administrators 
agrees as follows:
(b) To keep the premises in a safe and sanitary condition, and to comply 
with all obligations imposed upon TENANTS under applicable provi-
sions of building and housing codes materially affecting health and safe-
ty with respect to said premises and appurtenances, and to save [Mid-
town] harmless from all fines, penalties and costs for violations or non-
compliance by [Tennell] with any of said laws, requirements or regula-
tions, and from all liability arising out of any such violations or noncom-
pliance.
---
17. [Midtown] agrees to comply with the requirement of all applicable 
Federal, State and local laws, including health, housing and building 
codes and to deliver and maintain the premises in safe, sanitary and de-
cent condition.
18. [Tennell], by the execution of this Agreement, admits that the dwell-
ing unit described herein has been inspected by [her] and meets with 
[her] approval.  [Tennell] acknowledges hereby that said premises have 
been satisfactorily completed and that [Midtown] will not be required to 
repaint, replaster, or otherwise perform any other work, labor, or service 
309. Denton, 82 Ark. App. At 184, 119 S.W.3d at 522 (citing Wheeler v. Phillips Dev. 
Corp., 329 Ark. 354, 947 S.W.2d 380 (1997)).
310. Denton, 82 Ark. App. at 184, 119 S.W.3d at 522.
311. Id.
312. Tennell v. Midtown Apartments Ltd. P’ship., 2006 WL 3307466, at *1 (Ark. App. 
2006).
313. Id. at *2.
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which it has already performed for [Tennell].  [Tennell] admits that [she] 
has inspected the unit and found it to be in good and tenantable condi-
tion, and agrees that at the end of the occupancy hereunder to deliver up 
and surrender said premises to [Midtown] in as good condition as when 
received, reasonable wear and tear excepted.314
The Arkansas Court of Appeals interpreted this sloppy drafting to cre-
ate an ambiguity as to the meaning of the word “premises”.315 Although the 
Court acknowledged that the dictionary definition of “premises” is “’[a] 
house or building, along with its grounds,’” it still held this language to be 
ambiguous as to whether the term “premises” encompasses the common 
areas such as the parking lot.316 The Court found “it would not make sense 
for Tennell to be obligated to maintain the common areas because Midtown 
is the party in control of the common areas.”317 The Court remanded the case 
back to the trial court for determination of whether the landlord had liability 
for the parking lot.318 However, this unpublished decision does not fit with 
other decisions in Arkansas and should probably be viewed as an aberra-
tion.319
D. Split Maintenance Obligations
Less clear is the extent of a landlord’s liability when the lease agree-
ment splits the responsibility for maintenance between the landlord and the 
tenant.320 When the lease agreement divides responsibility for maintenance, 
allocating liability is still a matter of contract interpretation that is subject to 
summary judgment.321 For instance, in the unpublished decision of Sweeney 
v. Storthz, the lease provided:
Lessee will keep the leased premises, excepting the roof and outside 
walls, but including plumbing, heating and air condition units, water 





318. Tennell, 2006 WL 3307466, at *2.
319. Eoff v. Warden, 330 Ark. 244, 244, 953 S.W.2d 880, 881 (1997) (holding that Ar-
kansas does not represent the retention of control doctrine).
320. Steward v. McDonald, 330 Ark. 837, 958 S.W.2d 297 (1997) (discussing a case 
where the landlord agreed to be responsible for major repairs and the tenant for the minor 
repairs but not determining which party was responsible for a defective staircase). 
321. Sweeney v. Storthz, No. CA98-1300, 1999 WL 349786, at *3 (Ark. App. May 26, 
1999).
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tric wiring, fixtures, floors, plaster, plate glass and glass in repair and 
will do all necessary painting throughout the term of this lease.322
The plaintiff injured his leg when he fell through a utility box behind 
the building that should have been covered with a metal plate but was in-
stead covered with a piece of plywood.323 However, the utility box was not 
part of the roof or outside walls, so the landlord had no liability.324 The East-
ern District Court of Arkansas, also in an unpublished decision, reached the 
same conclusion of no liability on the part of the landlord when an employee 
of a tenant slipped on an oil slick because the lease only obligated the land-
lord to repair the roof, exterior walls and foundation of the building.325
E. Obligations to Repair When a Written Lease Agreement Continues on 
a Month-to-Month Basis After Termination
An interesting question exists when the written lease expires and the 
parties continue on a month-to-month lease. In Majewski v. Cantrell, the 
parties had a written lease that obligated the landlord to repair the roof.326
The term of the lease agreement expired but the parties continued their rela-
tionship on a month-to-month basis.327 During the month-to-month period, 
an employee of the tenant slipped on rainwater that entered through a leak in 
the roof.328 The landlord argued that the obligation to repair the roof expired 
with the written lease even though the record showed that the landlord con-
tinued to make repairs as needed.329 The Court found that the continued re-
pairs to the roof belied any argument that the obligation expired with the 
written lease so the landlord had liability for the injuries to the tenant’s em-
ployee.330
F. Obligation to Reimburse a Tenant for Repairs or Improvements for 
Wrongful Termination
A tenant has no claim against the landlord for reimbursement for re-
pairs or improvements the tenant makes to the leasehold estate absent an 
322. Id. at *1.
323. Id.
324. Id. at *3.
325. Walker v. Mr. Maint., Inc., No. 2:07CV000067, 2009 WL 1405205, at *6 (E.D. Ark. 
May 19, 2009).
326. Majewski v. Cantrell, 293 Ark. 360, 361-62, 737 S.W.2d 649, 650 (1987).
327. Id. at 362, 737 S.W.2d at 650.
328. Id. at 361, 737 S.W.2d at 650.
329. Id. at 362, 737 S.W.2d  at 651.
330. Id.
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express agreement to the contrary.331 As the Arkansas Supreme Court said in 
1888:
The law imposes no obligation upon a landlord to pay his tenant for im-
provements made by him upon the demised premises.  The tenant is pre-
sumed to repair and improve for his own benefit; and his right to the re-
sult of his labor expended for that purpose is to reap the enhanced benefit 
during the term, and, within certain limitations, to remove the improve-
ments before its expiration.  It is only by virtue of an express agreement 
by the landlord to pay for improvements that the tenant can recover their 
value of him.332
According to a more recent Arkansas Court of Appeals decision, “In 
Arkansas, a lessor has no obligation to pay for repairs or improvements that 
a lessee makes to a leasehold, unless the lessor agrees to do so.”333 Further-
more, the mere fact that the landlord permitted the installation of improve-
ments, or made no objection to the installation of the improvements, will not 
obligate the landlord to reimburse the tenant for the cost of the improve-
ments.334 “At the termination of a lease, the tenant can recover from the 
landlord for the improvements made by the tenant only in those cases in 
which the landlord has so agreed to pay the tenant.”335
However, this rule does not apply if the landlord wrongfully terminates 
the lease.336 As stated by the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1905, “When a 
landlord unlawfully evicts a tenant from the premises, the tenant is entitled 
to recover as damages whatever loss results to him as a direct and natural 
consequence of the wrongful act of the landlord.”337
The doctrine of caveat lessee has nothing to do with the measure of 
damages when a lessor wrongfully terminates a lease. Additionally, it does 
not bar the tenant from recovering the full measure of its damages, which 
may include the cost of improvements to the leasehold estate.338 For purpos-
es of determining damages, “the correct measure of damages is the amount 
331. National Housewares Corp. v. Trahin, 247 Ark. 1, 4, 444 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1969). See 
also Hale v. Ruff, CA98-1373, 1999 WL 436281, at *5 (Ark. Ct. App. June 23, 1999); 
Earle’s Adm’x v. Hale’s Adm’r, 31 Ark. 470, 471 (1876).
332. Gocio v. Day, 51 Ark. 46, 46, 9 S.W. 433, 433 (1888). See also Kutter v. Smith, 69 
U.S. 491, 500, 17 L. Ed. 830 (1864).
333. Hale v. Ruff, CA98-1373, 1999 WL 436281, at *5 (Ark. Ct. App. June 23, 1999).
334. Gocio, 51 Ark. at 46, 9 S.W. at 433.  
335. Capitol Monument Co. v. State Capitol Grounds Comm’n ex rel. Murry, 220 Ark. 
946, 948, 251 S.W.2d 473, 475 (1952).
336. Hale v. Ruff, CA98-1373, 1999 WL 436281, at *5 (Ark. Ct. App. June 23, 1999).
337. McElvaney v. Smith, 76 Ark. 468, 468, 88 S.W. 981, 982 (1905). See also Malone 
v. Wade, 148 Ark. 548, 548, 230 S.W. 579, 581 (1921) and Brickey v. Lacy, 245 Ark. 860, 
863, 435 S.W.2d 443, 445 (1968) and Burdan v. Walton, 286 Ark. 98, 101, 689 S.W.2d 543, 
545 (1985).
338. Hale, 1999 WL 436281, at *5.
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by which the fair market value of the lease exceeds the agreed-upon rent.”339
The tenant is entitled to recover the cost of repairs and improvements made 
to the leasehold in situations where the landlord wrongfully terminates.340
The damages for wrongful eviction include funds expended by the tenant for 
repairs or improvements that can only be used in the leased premises, such 
as flooring installed in the premises.341 The damages are limited to actual 
and special damages and do not include remote or speculative damages.342
For the purpose of valuing the improvements in determining the ten-
ant’s losses for a wrongful eviction, the value of the improvements are to be 
considered in determining the value of the remaining leasehold interest.343
Therefore, the proper jury instruction for determining the value of the im-
provement is to instruct the jury “to consider this evidence [of the value of 
the improvements], not as measure of damages, but in determining the value 
of the remaining leasehold interest.”344 The tenant may also be entitled to
some or all of the cost of relocating to another location.345
VI. TORT CLAIMS IN ARKANSAS RESULTING FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF 
THIRD PARTIES
At common law, tort liability claims by tenants and guests of tenants 
arising from injuries caused by the criminal acts of third-parties are subject 
to the general caveat lessee liability limitations.346 Protecting tenants from 
criminal acts is much more difficult than protecting tenants from other haz-
ards, such as defects in construction. As pointed out by one court, “The 
criminal can be expected anywhere, any time, and has been a risk of life for 
a long time. He can be expected in the village, monastery and the castle 
keep.”347 The same court observed, “the landlord cannot be expected to pro-
tect them [tenants] against the wiles of felonry any more than the society can 
always protect them upon the common streets and highways leading to their 
339. Pearson v. Henrickson, 336 Ark. 12, 19, 983 S.W.2d 419, 423 (1999).
340. Byers v. Moore, 110 Ark. 504, 504, 163 S.W. 147, 149 (1913). See also Hale v. 
Ruff, CA98-1373, 1999 WL 436281, at *5 (Ark. Ct. App. June 23, 1999).
341. Byers, 110 Ark. at 504, 163 S.W. at 149.
342. Wakin v. Morgan, 165 Ark. 234, 234, 263 S.W. 783, 784 (1924) and Home Co. v. 
Lammers, 221 Ark. 311, 316, 254 S.W.2d 65, 67 (1952). See also Reeves v. Romines, 132 
Ark. 599, 201 S.W. 822 (1918) (holding that the wrongfully-evicted tenant could not recover 
anticipated profits from crops when the tenant pled no other measure of damages).
343. Pearson, 336 Ark. at 20, 983 S.W.2d at 424.
344. Id., 983 S.W. 2d at 424.
345. Byers, 110 Ark. at 504, 163 S.W. at 149. See also Franks v. Rogers, 156 Ark. 120, 
120, 245 S.W. 311, 312 (1922).
346. Neisser, supra note 11, at 531 (1990). See also Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 399 
N.E.2d 596, 598 (Ill. 1979).
347. Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 746 (Pa. 1984).
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residence or indeed in their home itself.”348 Furthermore, there are inherent 
difficulties in deterring crime. One court noted:
In this day of an inordinate volume of criminal activity, there are a myri-
ad of “security devices” available to the public, including the hiring of 
armed guards.  No one really knows why people commit crime, hence no 
one really knows what is “adequate” deterrence in any given situation.  
While bright lights may deter some, they will not deter all.  Some per-
sons cannot be deterred by anything short of impenetrable walls and 
armed guards.
It would be intolerable and grossly unfair to permit a lay jury, after the 
fact, to determine in any case that security measures were “inadequate,” 
especially in light of the fact that the decision would always be rendered 
in a case where the security had in fact proved to be inadequate.349
Even in states with long-standing exceptions to the caveat lessee doc-
trine, courts have only recently begun imposing a duty on landlords to pro-
tect tenants from criminal acts of third-parties.350 Those cases that have im-
posed some duty on landlords have generally followed a tort law approach 
to liability arising from affirmative acts by the landlord or based on the land-
lord’s knowledge of the foreseeability of a criminal attack.351 For instance, 
South Carolina takes a tort law approach based on affirmative acts of the 
landlord.352 South Carolina recognizes a fundamental difference of the land-
lord-tenant relationship from other relationships such as store owner-invitee 
and innkeeper-guest.353 Accordingly, South Carolina does not impose an 
affirmative duty to protect tenants from criminal activity merely by reason 
of the relationship, but in order for liability to arise, some negligence on the 
part of the landlord is required that contributes to the injury caused by the 
criminal activity.354 South Carolina also held that an obligation to maintain 
the premises in a habitable condition does not impose a duty on a landlord to 
protect tenants from criminal activities of others.355 However, some courts in 
348. Id. at 745.
349. 7735 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Super. Ct., 172 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1981).
350. Mostafa, supra note 1, at 975. See also Irene S. Mazuna, Comment, Condo Associa-
tions—New Cop on the Beat: Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Associ-
ation, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 325, 326 (1999).
351. Mostafa, supra note 1, at 985. See also Cooke v. Allstate Mgmt. Corp., 741 F.Supp. 
1205, 1214 (D.S.C. 1990); Johnston v. Harris, 198 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Mich. 1972); Rowe v. 
State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1364 (Ill. 1988).
352. Cooke, 741 F.Supp. at 1214.
353. Cramer v. Balcor Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 441 S.E.2d 317, 318 (S.C. 1994).
354. Id. at 318–19. See also Cooke, 741 F.Supp. at 1214.
355. Cramer, 441 S.E.2d at 319.
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other jurisdictions have found that the failure to provide adequate security 
equates to a breach of the warranty of habitability.356
The South Carolina approach is similar to that utilized in Oklahoma 
where the duty owed by the landlord is 
“to use reasonable care to maintain the common areas of the premises in 
such a manner as to insure that the likelihood of criminal activity is not 
unreasonably enhanced by the condition of those common premises [. . .]
Where the premises provided are inadequately secured due to ineffective 
or defective materials, a duty on the part of the landlord to provide re-
pairs or modifications would arise upon notification of the defect by the 
tenant.”357
The landlord is not “placed in a position of quasi-guarantor of the ten-
ant’s safety.”358
One frequently cited case on this issue is Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts 
Ave. Apartment Corp.359 The extent of liability imposed on landlords by the 
court in Kline is not followed in many jurisdictions even though many 
courts consider the case in deciding what, if any, liability to impose.360
Kline established a duty on the part of landlords in Washington, D.C. to 
protect tenants from criminal acts.361 In the Kline case, the tenant suffered 
injuries when she was criminally assaulted and robbed one night by an in-
truder in the common hallway of her apartment.362 The tenant moved into 
the apartment complex seven years earlier when the building had a doorman 
stationed in the front lobby twenty-four hours a day, an employee stationed 
at a desk near the elevator, and two attendants in the parking garage.363 By 
the time of the attack, the number of attendees and guards had diminished 
significantly even though there had been an increase in crime at the apart-
ment complex.364 However, after the original term of the lease expired, the 
356. See, e.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 443 (N.J. 1980); Hemmings v. Pel-
ham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P’ship, 826 A.2d 443, 453 (Md. 2003). See also Braitman v. Over-
look Terrace Corp., 346 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. 1975) (holding that “[a] residential tenant can 
recover damages from his landlord upon proper proof that the latter unreasonably enhanced 
the risk of loss due to theft by failing to supply adequate locks to safeguard the tenant’s prem-
ises after suitable notice of the defect.”).
357. Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 458 (Okla. 1986).
358. Id. at 460.
359. A WestlawNext Search conducted on August 5, 2013 showed 701 citing references
for Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
360. Neisser, supra note 11, at 533. See also Lay, 732 P.2d at 457.
361. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481.
362. Id. at 478.
363. Id. 478–79.
364. Id. at, 479.
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tenant continued to reside at the complex under a month-to-month tenancy 
even though the security had lessened over time.365
After the court considered the facts, it concluded that the landlord had a
duty to protect the tenant from criminal acts.366 The Kline court’s holding 
expanded the exception to the caveat lessee doctrine for common areas un-
der the control of the landlord.367 The court acknowledged that prior case 
law on the exception “dealt with a physical defect in the building leading to 
plaintiff’s injury, [but] the rationale as applied to predictable criminal acts 
by third parties is the same.”368 The court also acknowledged several reasons 
for not making landlords responsible for criminal acts, including:
Judicial reluctance to tamper with the traditional common law concept of 
the landlordtenant [sic] relationship; the notion that the act of a third per-
son in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of 
the harm to another resulting therefrom; the oftentimes difficult problem 
of determining foreseeability of criminal acts; the vagueness of the 
standard which the landlord must meet; the economic consequences of 
the imposition of the duty; and conflict with the public policy allocating 
the duty of protecting citizens from criminal acts to the government ra-
ther than the private sector.369
Despite recognizing these many reasons for not implying a duty for 
landlords to safeguard tenants from criminal acts, without any detailed ex-
planation why, the court declared, “[t]he rationale of the general rule exon-
erating a third party from any duty to protect another from a criminal attack 
has no applicability to the landlord-tenant relationship in multiple dwelling 
houses. The landlord is no insurer of his tenant’s safety, but he certainly is 
no bystander.”370 The court held that a landlord with notice that the premises 
may be subject to criminal attacks has “a duty to take those steps which are 
within his power to minimize the predictable risk to his tenants.”371 The 
court went on to hold, “we place the duty of taking protective measures 
guarding the entire premises and the areas particularly under the landlord’s 
control against the perpetration of criminal acts upon the landlord, the party 
to the lease contract who has the effective capacity to perform these neces-
sary acts.”372 The court compared the duty to that of an innkeeper to a 
guest,373 which is a traditionally high-level duty.
365. Id. at 485.
366. Id. at 481.





372. Id. at 482.
373. Kline, 439 F.2d at 485.
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The court in Kline also recognized the difficulty in defining the stand-
ard of care that a landlord must meet under the new obligations imposed by 
the decision.374 The court said, 
The specific measures to achieve this standard [of care] vary with the in-
dividual circumstances.  It may be impossible to describe in detail for all
situations of landlord-tenant relationships, and evidence of custom 
amongst the landlords of the same class of building may play a signifi-
cant role in determining if the standard has been met.375
The Court in Kline also recognized the great cost that its decision 
would cause.376 The court said:
Granted, the discharge of this duty of protection by landlords will cause, 
in many instances, the expenditure of large sums for additional equip-
ment and services, and granted the cost will be ultimately passed on to 
the tenant in the form of increased rents.  This prospect, in itself, howev-
er, is no deterrent to ou[r] acknowledging and giving force to the duty, 
since without protection the tenant already pays in losses from theft, 
physical assault and increased insurance premiums.
The landlord is entirely justified in passing on the cost of increased pro-
tective measures to his tenants, but the rationale of compelling the land-
lord to do it in the first place is that he is the only one who is in a posi-
tion to take the necessary protective measures for overall protection of 
the premises, which he owns in whole and rents in part to individual ten-
ants.377
In Arkansas a landlord has “no duty to protect a tenant from criminal 
acts.”378 As stated by the Arkansas Court of Appeals:
[T]he general rule is that a landlord is under no legal obligation to a ten-
ant for injuries sustained in common areas, absent a statute or agreement, 
and that, consistent with that principle, it is the general and common law 
rule that a landlord does not owe a tenant or social guest a duty to protect 
the tenant or guest from criminal acts.379
The leading case in Arkansas on the liability of a landlord to a tenant 
for criminal acts that occur on the premises is the 1994 case of Bartley v. 
374. Id. at 486.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 488.
377. Id.
378. Boren v. Worthen Nat. Bank of Arkansas, 324 Ark. 416, 421, 921 S.W.2d 934, 938 
(1996); see also Nash v. Landmark Storage, LLC, 102 Ark. App. 182, 185, 283 S.W.3d 605, 
608 (2008).
379. Bussey v. Bearden, 2011 Ark. App. 353, at 5, 384 S.W.2d 41 (2011).
1094 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
Sweetser. Jenny Bartley was a twenty-one-year-old college student who 
leased an apartment from the Sweetsers.380 Early one morning, two men 
knocked on Ms. Bartley’s door.381 The door of the apartment had no win-
dows and only a simple push-button doorknob lock.382 Unable to look out-
side without opening the door, Ms. Bartley opened the door to ascertain who 
knocked.383 When Ms. Bartley opened the door, the two men forced their 
way in and raped her.384
Ms. Bartley sued the Sweetsers alleging that the Sweetsers:  (i) failed 
to provide adequate security due to the windowless door and the inadequate-
ly lit common areas, and (ii) failed to warn her that the apartment complex 
was prone to criminal activity.385 Ms. Bartley argued that the lease prohibit-
ed her from installing additional locks on the apartment door and that the 
Sweetsers retained sole dominion and control over the apartment door and 
the common areas.386 Ms. Bartley argued that she may not have been at-
tacked if her door had had a peephole or chain lock.387
While acknowledging Arkansas’ basic caveat lessee approach to land-
lord liability, Ms. Bartley argued for the adoption of positions accepted by 
other states, such as that taken in the Kline case.388 She also tried to rely on 
the case of Keck v. American Employment Agency, where the court found 
that an employer might have liability for sending an employee into a situa-
tion where she was abducted and raped.389 The Arkansas Supreme Court in 
Keck held that an employer may have a duty of care to protect the employee 
from abduction and rape because of the employer’s contractual relationship 
with the employee, the employer’s ability to foresee some danger to her and 
the employer’s degree of control over the situation into which it sent the 
employee.390 However, the Keck case was not a landlord liability case; in-
stead, it was an employer liability case.391
Ms. Bartley also relied on the Western District Court of Arkansas case 
of Jackson v. Warner Holdings, Ltd.392 In the Jackson case, the federal court 
faced very similar facts to the Bartley case. In Jackson, an intruder broke 
380. Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 118, 890 S.W.2d 250, 250 (1994).
381. Id. at 119, 890 S.W.2d at 250.
382. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 250.
383. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 250.
384. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 250.
385. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 250.
386. Bartley, 319 Ark. at 119, 890 S.W.2d at 250.
387. Id. at 119, 890 S.W.2d at 251.
388. Id. at 121, 890 S.W.2d at 251.
389. Id. at 120, 890 S.W.2d at 251.
390. Keck v. Am. Empl. Agency, Inc., 279, Ark. 294, 302, 652 S.W.2d 2, 6 (1983).
391. Bartley, 319 Ark. at 120, 890 S.W.2d at 251.
392. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 251.
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into Ms. Cheryl Lynn Jackson’s apartment and repeatedly raped her.393 Ms. 
Jackson alleged that the attack was caused by the negligence of the landlord 
for failing to provide “reasonable and adequate” security, adequate door 
locks and adequate curtains to insure privacy, among other things.394 The 
Federal court stated that, at the time, Arkansas had not decided “[w]hether a 
landlord has a duty to provide adequate security in the form of door locks, 
lighting and security devices to protect tenants from criminal attacks by 
third persons.”395 The Federal court acknowledged its obligation to rule as 
the Arkansas Supreme Court would rule if presented with the same ques-
tion.396 The Federal court analyzed three cases:  Joseph v. Riffel, Kilbury v. 
McConnell and Keck v. American Employment Agency.397 The Federal court 
interpreted this line of Arkansas Supreme Court cases as marching from a 
“conservative” approach to landlord liability (i.e., the 1932 case of Joseph v. 
Riffel) to a more moderate approach marked with “reluctance” to continue 
the total landlord immunity (i.e., the 1969 case of Kilbury v. McConnell) to 
a “liberal” rule of landlord liability (i.e., the 1983 case of Keck v. American 
Employment Agency, Inc.).398 Even though Keck was not a landlord liability
case, the Federal court believed that the Arkansas Supreme Court was sig-
naling an intention to follow the logic of Keck in landlord-tenant cases be-
cause the decision cited a California landlord-tenant case in its recitation of 
authority for when a third-party could be held liable for the damages suf-
fered by a rape victim.399 The Federal court concluded:
The progression of the law in Arkansas, as evidenced by the cases dis-
cussed above and in other jurisdictions, combined with the analogy to 
O’Hara [the California case] mentioned in Keck, and the liberal rules re-
garding motions to dismiss, persuasively indicate that the Arkansas Su-
preme Court, if presented with the issue at bar would recognize a duty 
owed by a landlord to his or her tenants to employ reasonable security 
measures to avoid foreseeable criminal attacks by third persons.400
However, when faced with the facts in Bartley, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court rejected the Federal court’s approach.401 The Court found the Federal 
court’s reliance on Keck to be misplaced because the nature of the case did 





398. Id. at 648–49.
399. Jackson, 617 F.Supp. at 648 (W.D. Ark. 1985). In Keck, the California court found 
that a landlord may have liability when a woman was raped in her apartment and sued the
landlord for failing to take reasonable steps to protect her.
400. Id. at 648–49.
401. Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 120, 890 S.W.2d 250, 251 (1994).
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not make it part of Arkansas history of landlord/tenant law.402 Therefore, the 
Federal court misconstrued the progression of Arkansas’ case law. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court noted that some states, such as Massa-
chusetts in the Kline case, have recognized a duty on the part of a landlord 
“to take reasonable steps to protect a tenant from foreseeable criminal acts 
committed by intruders on the premises.”403 However, the court found that 
other jurisdictions “have generally found that, as a matter of public policy, it 
was not fair to impose this duty of protection on the landlord.”404 The court 
quoted the reasons set forth in American Law of Landlord Tenant (1980) by 
Robert S. Schoshinski for maintaining the common law position against 
imposing a duty of protection on landlords as follows:
Judicial reluctance to tamper with the common law concept of the land-
lord-tenant relationship, the notion that the act of a third person in com-
mitting an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to an-
other…; the often times difficult problem of determining foreseeability 
of criminal acts; the vagueness of the standard which the landlord must 
meet; the economic consequences of the imposition of the duty; and the 
conflict with public policy allocating the duty of protecting citizens from 
criminal acts to the government rather than the private sector.405
The Arkansas Supreme Court said, “For more than sixty years, this
court, when reviewing landlord/tenant cases, has seemed content to adhere 
to the general rule and common law, and has consistently imposed no legal 
obligation upon a landlord for a tenant’s injury on the premises unless a duty 
is imposed by statute or agreement.”406 The court found no such obligation 
in the lease agreement.407 The court acknowledged that the lease agreement 
prohibited Ms. Bartley from installing additional locks on the door but re-
jected the idea that such a prohibition could be read as the landlord assum-
ing a duty of protecting the tenant from criminal behavior.408 The court 
found that such a provision “merely assured the Sweetsers access to tenant 
premises during reasonable hours in order to make an inspection or neces-
sary repairs.”409 The court concluded, “[i]n sum, a landlord, under Arkansas 
law, is not the insurer of the safety of tenants or others upon the premis-
es.”410
402. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 251.
403. Id. at 121, 890 S.W.2d at 251.
404. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 251.
405. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 251 (citing Robert S. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord 
Tenant § 4.14 (1980)).
406. Bartley, 319 Ark. at 121, 890 S.W.2d at 251.
407. Id. at 122, 890 S.W.2d at 251.
408. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 251.
409. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 251.
410. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 251.
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Justice Newbern concurred in the Bartley v. Sweetser decision.411 Jus-
tice Newbern argued that a landlord could be found negligent in the land-
lord-tenant relationship for, among other things, a failure to provide ade-
quate security.412 Justice Newbern concurred in the decision because he felt 
the proximate cause of Ms. Bartley’s injuries was her decision to open the 
door, regardless of the types of locks that the landlord may have provided.413
Notwithstanding, Justice Newbern said:
Negligence is not a static concept.  That which was not characterized as 
negligence 60 years ago might be so characterized today in view of 
changed conditions. In a proper case, we should be willing to examine 
whether there is anything about the landlord-tenant relationship which 
would preclude us from holding that a landlord might be liable for de-
monstrable negligence causing injury to a tenant.414
In the more recent case of Bussey v. Bearden, Larry Bussey leased an 
apartment from Melvin and Mural Bearden.415 Larry’s daughter-in-law, Te-
resa Bussey, came to his apartment to feed his cat while he was out of 
town.416 Unfortunately, Ms. Bussey walked into a burglary being committed 
by the neighbors from an adjoining apartment that had entered through a 
common attic.417 The burglars severely beat Ms. Bussey.418 Ms. Bussey sued 
the landlords for breach of a duty to protect apartment guests by allowing a 
dangerous attic design to remain without taking steps to protect guests or 
alert tenants about the design.419 Ms. Bussey sought to distinguish earlier 
cases through the following language in the lease agreement: 
“[m]anagement shall not be liable to Resident for any damages to Resident’s 
person or property, or to Resident’s agents, employees, guests, or invitees 
other than for Management’s negligence” [emphasis added in the Court’s 
decision].420
However, the Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected the notion that a 
carve-out in the lease agreement for the landlord’s negligence could be read 
to create an affirmative obligation on the part of the landlord to prevent 
criminal acts.421 The Court said, “[t]his quoted contractual language cannot 
be stretched to create an exception to the general rule in Arkansas and im-
411. Id., 890 S.W.2d at 251.
412. Id. at 122–23, 890 S.W.2d at 251.
413. Bartley, 319 Ark. at 122, 890 S.W.2d at 251.
414. Id. at 123, 890 S.W.2d at 251.
415. Bussey v. Bearden, 2011 Ark. App. 353, at 1, 384 S.W.3d 41, 42 (2011).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 2, 384 S.W.3d at 42.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 6, 384 S.W.3d at 44.
421. Bussey, 2011 Ark. App. 353, at 6, 384 S.W.3d at 45.
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pose an express duty upon the landlord to protect tenants and guests from 
criminal assault.”422
A landlord will typically not be held to have undertaken a duty to pro-
tect tenants simply because the landlord instituted some security 
measures.423 In Bussey v. Bearden, the landlord provided some security by 
providing “locks and deadbolts on apartment doors, locks on windows, and 
stringing chicken wire in the common attic areas of the apartments to define 
the spaces belonging to the separate apartments.”424 The Arkansas Court of 
Appeals found that these activities were not enough to push the landlord 
outside of the caveat lessee protections.425
In Hall v. Rental Management, Inc., the plaintiff sued the owner of the 
apartment complex after her son was shot and killed on the premises by a 
guest of another resident.426 The plaintiff alleged that the landlord had as-
sumed the duty to provide security.427 The plaintiff based her case on a secu-
rity manual provided by the apartment management company that included 
a section titled “SECURITY” that said:
A feeling of security is important to all residents.  If you notice any unu-
sual or suspicions activity, please notify the Resident Manager immedi-
ately.  All residents are asked to cooperate when seeing abuse to anyone 
or to the property.  Do not open the door to anyone unless you know who 
it is.  If you are in doubt, call, the management if necessary.428
The security manual also included a section titled “HOUSE RULES” 
that said:
The management cannot be responsible for your children in the event of 
parent negligence.  We can only see that the grounds and apartment are a 
safe place to live; but without a parent, it becomes very unsafe and 
threatens the life of your child.
Because of management’s concern for safety and your peace of mind, 
children under school age cannot be allowed in public areas such as 




423. Id.; see also Dailey v. Hous. Auth. for Birmingham Dist., 639 So. 2d 1343, 1346 
(Ala. 1994) (holding that hiring a security guard indicates an attempt to discourage crime, not 
a voluntary assumption of the duty to provide protection from all criminals).
424. Bussey, 2011 Ark. App. 353, at 7, 384 S.W.3d at 45.
425. See id.
426. Hall v. Rental Mgmt. Inc., 323 Ark. 143, 143, 913 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1996).
427. Id., 913 S.W.2d at 294.
428. Id. at 143, 913 S.W.2d at 295.
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You have the same privacy as if your apartment were a separate home.  
Each tenant has the same right of privacy and peaceful enjoyment.  Since 
the apartments are close together, you must think of the other people 
who live next door to you.  To give your neighbors the privacy that they 
deserve, we ask that your children do not play outside beyond the time of 
9:00 p.m. each evening.429
The plaintiff in Hall v. Rental Management, Inc. also introduced the 
apartment complex’s employee procedures manual, which had three pages 
dedicated to “Security” issues.430 The manual discussed general security 
advice and included the following provisions:
On-site management will have to recommend to the Property Manager if 
security officers are needed.  It is important that ALL on-site personnel 
be security and safety conscious at all times.
******
Security patrol may be performed by employees to check the property in 
the evenings.  A regular check will ward off problems and inform the 
management of any unusual activity.431
The manual also said:
Crime is a major worry for residents and there is no substitute for having 
the property patrolled by well-trained people, whether by our own em-
ployees or professional security personnel. Strict management of tenants
[sic] behavior and the behavior of guests make it clear from the start that 
the property is a no-nonsense place. Adhering to strict policy will not be 
attractive to those who just want to ‘hang out.’ ‘Hanging out’ will not be 
tolerated. This is the beginning of major problems.
Activities that are disturbing and impose on the rights of others will not 
be tolerated, not only from residents but from others. Activity of this 
type must never be allowed to get started. Our reputation will serve as 
some type of security measure.
Residents may blame the management for failing to provide security or 
for providing it negligently. Legal liability for negligence may perhaps 
be reduced by hiring an outside Security Patrol.
If there is a problem with security, the resident must contact the RMI of-
fice. We will be happy to go to any length to correct the problem.
429. Id., 913 S.W.2d at 295.
430. Id., 913 S.W.2d at 295.
431. Id., 913 S.W.2d at 295.
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It is our goal to at all times provide a safe place for our residents and 
family. We feel our residents have the right to be safe and live in a 
peaceful environment.432
The landlord also undertook certain safety practices “such as lighting, 
evening patrols, and communicating with residents regarding suspicious 
activities.”433 However, the Arkansas Supreme Court was not persuaded that 
the combination of the security manuals and safety practices rose to the lev-
el of the landlord assuming the obligation to protect tenants from criminal 
behavior.434 The Court said, “[w]e are reluctant to hold that a landlord’s use 
of these modest, conscientious measures imposes a full blown duty to pro-
tect tenants from third party criminal activities.”435
The case of Nash v. Landmark Storage presented an interesting situa-
tion where the landlord expressly disclaimed liability for criminal acts of 
third parties in the lease agreement but posted a sign on the property stating 
(falsely) that the premises were under video surveillance that the tenant al-
legedly relied on in selecting the facility.436 Despite the sign and the leasing 
agent’s failure to inform the tenant that there was not really any video sur-
veillance, the court found that the unambiguous disclaimer of liability for 
criminal acts in the lease prevented the tenant from reasonably relying on 
the sign to create liability on the part of the landlord.437
The immunity under caveat lessee afforded to landlords also extends to 
management agents that a landlord may engage to operate leased properties 
as illustrated by the case of Lacy v. Flake and Kelley Management, Inc.438
The facts in the case of Lacy v. Flake and Kelley Management, Inc. are par-
ticularly horrific.439 Monica Lacy, an employee of a business that leased 
space from U.S. Bank, left her office and was abducted in the parking lot 
whereupon she was subsequently raped and robbed by four men.440 The 
building was managed on behalf of the landlord by Flake & Kelley Man-
agement, Inc. (“F&K”).441 Ms. Lacy filed suit against the landlord and F&K 
432. Hall, 323 Ark. at 143, 913 S.W.2d at 296.
433. Id. at 143, 913 S.W.2d at 297.
434. Id., 913 S.W.2d at 297.
435. Id., 913 S.W.2d at 297.
436. Nash v. Landmark Storage, LLC, 102 Ark. App. 182, 186, 283 S.W.3d 605, 608 
(2008).
437. Id. at 187–88, 283 S.W.3d at 609–10.
438. Lacy v. Flake & Kelley Mgmt., Inc., 366 Ark. 365, 370, 235 S.W.3d 894, 898 
(2006).
439. Id. at 366, 235 S.W.3d at 895.
440. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 895.
441. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 895.
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on the theory that the defendants were negligent in their failure to provide 
adequate security.442
An important fact in the Lacy case was that F&K had contracted with 
Guardsmark, Inc., a security firm, to provide a lobby guard during the hours 
that the abduction occurred.443 However, the contract with Guardsmark did 
not require the guards to patrol the parking lot or other areas outside of the 
building.444 The lease agreement also included the following provisions:
3.14  Tenant and Tenant’s agents, employees, and invitees will comply 
fully with all requirements of Rules of the Building which are attached 
hereto and, which are a part of this Lease as though fully set out herein:
4.1  Landlord shall have the following rights exercisable without notice 
or demand and without liability to Tenant for damage or injury to prop-
erty, persons or business (all claims for damage therefore being hereby 
released by Tenant), and without effecting an eviction or disturbance of 
Tenant’s use or possession of the Premises or giving rise to any claim for 
setoffs or abatement of rent:
(g)  To take all such reasonable measures as Landlord may deem advisa-
ble for the security of the Building and its occupants, including without 
limitation, the search of all persons entering or leaving the Building, the 
evacuation of the Building for cause, suspected cause, or for drill pur-
poses, the temporary denial of access to the Building, and the closing of 
the Building after normal business hours and on Saturdays, Sundays and 
holidays, subject, however, to Tenant’s right to admittance when the 
Building is closed after normal business hours under such reasonable 
regulations as Landlord may prescribe from time to time, which may in-
clude by way of example but not limitation, that persons entering or 
leaving the Building, whether or not during normal business hours, iden-
tify themselves to a security officer by registration or otherwise and that 
such persons establish the right to enter or leave the Building.445
The plaintiff argued that the language of this lease agreement imposed 
sufficient burdens on the landlord (and consequently, its agent, F&K) to 
create a duty to provide security for the building and protect the tenants 
from third-party criminal activities.446 The Court allowed that this language 
in the lease agreement may have created a duty to monitor entry into the 
building and possibly protect against criminal activities arising from such 
entry.447 However, the language of the lease, and the conduct of F&K on 
442. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 895.
443. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 895.
444. Lacy, 366 Ark. at 366, 235 S.W.3d at 895.
445. Id. at 368, 235 S.W.3d at 896.
446. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 896.
447. Id. at 370, 235 S.W.3d at 898.
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behalf of the landlord, did not create a “comprehensive duty” to protect 
against all criminal activities that may occur on the premises, including 
criminal activities that may occur in the parking lot.448
The Lacy case can therefore be cited for two propositions. First, an 
agent of a landlord has no duty, and thus no liability, greater than that of the 
landlord even though the agent’s business may be to manage leased proper-
ty.449 Second, even if a landlord assumes some duty to provide protection 
(i.e., safeguarding the entryway), such assumption does not create a com-
prehensive duty extending to all areas or ways that a tenant may be 
harmed.450
VII. TORT CLAIMS BY THIRD PARTIES AGAINST LANDLORDS IN ARKANSAS
A. General Obligation of Landlords to Third Parties
The caveat lessee doctrine also provides protection for landlords 
against injuries suffered by third parties on the property.451 However, some 
states impose on the landlord the same duty to all persons lawfully upon the 
lased premises as the landlord owes the tenant.452 Ohio held that “it is im-
proper to treat a tenant’s guest as a licensee with regard to a landlord and to 
hold that a landlord merely owes a tenant’s guest the duty to refrain from 
wanton or willful misconduct.”453
Under Arkansas law, it is irrelevant whether a third party visitor to 
leased property is classified legally as a “licensee” or an “invitee” as long as 
the third-party visitor is present with the consent of the tenant.454 As the Ar-
448. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 898.
449. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 898.
450. Lacy, 366 Ark. at 370, 235 S.W.3d at 898.
451. Of course, some states have abandoned this concept along with the abandonment of 
the caveat lessee doctrine, such as Massachusetts. See, e.g., Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 
162, 168, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1980).
For parties to be in a landlord-tenant relationship, there are three essential elements that must 
be met to establish the relationship:  
(1) Contract, either express or implied.
(2) The occupancy of the tenant must be in subordination to the rights of the 
landlord, and a reversionary interest must remain in the landlord.
(3) There must be a transmission of the estate to the tenant, and he must gain 
possession of the demised premises.
Gray v. Davis, 270 Ark. 917, 921, 606 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ct. App. 1980); see also Smith v. 
Campbell, 71 Ark. App. 23, 26 S.W.3d 139 (2000); Love v. Cahn, 93 Ark. 215, 215, 124 
S.W. 259, 262 (1909).
452. Shump v. First Cont’l-Robinwood Assoc., 644 N.E.2d 291, 296 (1994); see also 
Belikka v. Green, 762 P.2d 997, 1003 (Or. 1988).
453. Shump, 644 N.E.2d at 296.
454. Stalter v. Akers, 303 Ark. 603, 605, 798 S.W.2d 428, 429 (1990); see also Miller v. 
Centerpoint Energy Resource Corp., 98 Ark. App. 102, 110, 250 S.W.3d 574, 580 (2007) 
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kansas Supreme Court held in the Stalter case, the legal status of the injured 
party “was immaterial in determining the rights and obligations between 
these parties so long as the appellee was on the premises with the consent of 
the lessee.”455
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that a third party visitor could only 
seek recovery from the landlord for injuries caused by a defective condition 
if the landlord had a contractual obligation to the tenant to maintain or repair 
the premises.456 The Court held that, as a condition precedent to a liability 
claim against the landlord, “the injured third party must establish a land-
lord’s contractual duty to repair a defect in the premises before he may re-
cover for an injury suffered upon leased property over which the landlord 
has relinquished possession and control to a tenant.”457
In Eoff v. Warden, a visitor to the premises was injured in the parking 
lot.458 The visitor tried unsuccessfully to argue that the landlord had retained 
possession and control of the parking lot of the apartment complex.459 How-
ever, since Arkansas does not recognize the retention of control exception to 
the caveat lessee doctrine, the landlord had no liability.460 Nevertheless, Jus-
tin Corbin wrote a strong dissent to the majority’s decision.461 Justin Corbin 
saw the decision in Eoff to be an extension of the landlord’s immunity from 
liability since no case involving injury to visitors in common areas con-
trolled by the landlord existed in Arkansas.462 Justice Corbin distinguished 
the holding in the earlier Stalter v. Akers case by pointing out that the injury 
to the visitor occurred on “a house the control of which had clearly been 
relinquished to the tenant.”463 However, in the Eoff case, the landlord had 
control of the parking lot lighting and where the parking barriers were locat-
ed.464 Justice Corbin opined:
If a landlord may not be held responsible for negligence in creating or
maintaining an ill-lighted apartment-house parking lot which is alleged 
to be a trap for the unwary, is the tenant responsible?  If not the tenant, 
(applying a caveat lessee analysis to a subtenant who claimed to be a licensee of the prime 
landlord). Under Arkansas law, a subtenant is not considered to be in privity of estate with 
the original landlord while an assignee is in privity. Abernathy v. Adous, 85 Ark. App. 242, 
149 S.W.3d 884 (2004).
455. Stalter, 303 Ark. at 605, 798 S.W.2d at 429.
456. Id. at  606, 798 S.W.2d at 430.
457. Id. at 607, 798 S.W.2d at 430.
458. 330 Ark. 244, 244, 953 S.W.2d 880, 881 (1997).
459. Id., 953 S.W.2d at 881.
460. Id., 953 S.W.2d at 881.
461. Id. at 244, 953 S.W.2d at 882.
462. Id., 953 S.W.2d at 882.
463. Id., 953 S.W.2d at 882.
464. Eoff, 330 Ark. at 244, 953 S.W.2d at 882.
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then is the alleged negligence simply a wrong without a remedy?  There 
is no need to reach such a result.465
B. Injuries to Employees
In Steward v. McDonald, Professional Services Industries, Inc. leased 
space from William and Jeannine Steward (the “Stewards”).466 Mr. McDon-
ald was injured when a riser broke on a staircase that was also missing a 
handrail.467 Mr. McDonald sued the Stewards under the general unsafe-
place-to-work statute, which stated in “pertinent part:  Every employer and 
every owner of a place of employment, place of public assembly, or public 
building, now or hereafter constructed shall construct, repair, and maintain it 
so as to render it safe [emphasis in the original quotation by the Court].”468
The trial court interpreted this statute to impose a duty on the landlord of a 
place of business to provide a safe place to work.469 However, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding “the general assembly did 
not intend for the phrase ‘every owner of a place of employment’ to expand 
or extend a landlord’s duty to provide a safe place to work for his tenant’s 
employees.”470
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on two principles of statu-
tory construction:  (1) “that statutes will not be taken in derogation of the 
common law unless the act shows that such was the intent of the legislature” 
and (2) that statutes are strictly construed “that impose duties or liabilities 
unknown at common law in favor of those upon whom the burden is sought 
to be imposed, and nothing will be taken as intended that is not clearly ex-
pressed.”471 The Court found that the General Assembly did not intend to 
expand the liability of a landlord, stating, “Had the legislature intended a 
radical change in the law to extend causes of action for negligence based on 
a landlord’s duty to his tenant, the Act [the unsafe-place-to-work statute] 
would have expressed such an intention in some plain and unmistakable 
terms.”472
In a concurrence to the Steward decision, Justice Brown disagreed with 
the majority’s interpretation of the unsafe-place-to-work statute.473 Justice 
Brown felt that the word “owner” in the statute was a clear reference to 
465. Id., 953 S.W.2d at 882.
466. Steward v. McDonald, 330 Ark. 837, 839, 958 S.W.2d 297, 298 (1997).
467. Id., 958 S.W.2d at 298.
468. Id., 958 S.W.2d at 298.
469. Id., 958 S.W.2d at 298.
470. Id. at 840, 958 S.W.2d at 298.
471. Id. at 841–42, 958 S.W.2d at 299.
472. Steward, 330 Ark. at 843, 958 S.W.2d at 300.
473. Id. at 844, 958 S.W.2d at 300 (Brown, J., concurring).
2013] CAVEAT WHO? 1105
landlords.474 He believed the statute established a statutory duty on a land-
lord to deliver a building intended as a workplace to the tenant in a safe 
condition.475 Justice Brown referred to the law of West Virginia, which 
adopted a nearly identical law to Arkansas the same year that Arkansas 
passed the law.476 When faced with similar facts, West Virginia interpreted 
the statute to require a landlord to provide a safe building for employees.477
C. Injuries to Third Parties Off-Premises
In Bryant v. Putnam, the landlords knowingly leased a house without a 
fence to a tenant who owned dogs.478 The dogs often roamed free and bit 
Mr. Bryant who was a pedestrian walking near the home.479 Mr. Bryant sued 
the landlords on the theory that the landlords were negligent in leasing a 
house without a fence to a tenant with dogs (there was some dispute over 
whether the landlords knew the dogs were a vicious breed).480 Though other 
states have extended liability to landlords where third-parties were injured 
on the property or where the landlord knew of the dangerous propensity of 
the animal, Arkansas declined to extend any liability to a landlord under 
these circumstances.481
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article began by posing the question of whether Arkansas can still 
be truly considered a caveat lessee state. Based on a review of the applicable 
case law and statutes, it is fair to continue classifying Arkansas as a caveat 
474. Id., 958 S.W.2d at 300.
475. Id., 958 S.W.2d at 300.
476. Id. at 845, 958 S.W.2d at 301.
477. Id. at 845, 958 S.W.2d at 301 (reviewing W. VA. CODE 21-3-1 (2013) and Pack v. 
Van Meter, 177 W. Va. 485, 354 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1986)). See also Pack, 177 W. Va. at 
489, 354 S.E.2d at 585 (imposing liability on a landlord by interpreting a statute that said, 
“Every employer and every owner of a place of employment, place of public assembly, or a 
public building, now or hereafter constructed, shall so conduct, repair and maintain the same 
as to render it reasonably safe.” (quoting W.VA. CODE 21-3-1)).
478. Bryant v. Putnam, 322 Ark. 284, 286, 908 S.W.2d 338, 338 (1995).
479. Id., 908 S.W.2d at 338.
480. Id., 908 S.W.2d at 338.
481. Id., 908 S.W.2d at 338. For instance, in New York, courts extended the retention of 
control exception to the caveat lessee doctrine to include an obligation to exclude vicious 
animals. See Siegel v. 1536-46 St. Johns Place Corp., 57 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (City Ct. 1945); 
see also Linebaugh By and Through Linebaugh v. Hyndman, 213 N.J. Super. 117, 121, 516 
A.2d 638, 640 (App. Div. 1986) aff’d, 106 N.J. 556, 524 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1987). However, 
New York does not expand the liability to animals where the landlord has no knowledge of 
the animal or its dangerous proclivities. See Strunk v. Zoltanski, 62 N.Y.2d 572, 575, 468 
N.E.2d 13, 15 (N.Y. 1984).
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lessee jurisdiction. However, this is not to say that the caveat lessee doctrine 
exists in Arkansas in its pure common law form, nor is it accurate to say that 
there are not many reasons for landlords to also beware. Arkansas courts 
have recognized exceptions to the caveat lessee doctrine, including the la-
tent defect exception and the negligently repaired exception.482 Arkansas 
also recognizes the constructive eviction defense for tenants.483 Additionally, 
Arkansas likely recognizes the implied warranty of fitness for premises that 
are incomplete at the time the lease is executed.484 Also, landlords can be 
held liable for reimbursing a tenant for the cost of improvements made by 
the tenant in the case of a wrongful eviction.485
Furthermore, landlords are often exposed to liability in Arkansas 
through contractual maintenance obligations that may have ambiguities 
leading to questions for a jury to resolve.486 Additionally, ambiguities can 
arise from the course of conduct of the parties, leading to liability expo-
sure.487
Other jurisdictions have established more exceptions to the caveat les-
see doctrine than Arkansas, some going so far as to eliminate the doctrine 
entirely.488 Other exceptions include a public use exception, a common area 
exception, and breach of an implied warranty of habitability for residential 
properties.489 Those that have abandoned the doctrine have mostly opted for 
a tort-style “reasonable person” approach to liability.490
While Arkansas has considered abandoning the doctrine, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court has held firm to the doctrine.491 Additionally, the Arkansas 
General Assembly recently codified Arkansas’s version of the caveat lessee 
doctrine, finding in the preamble to the bill that “the Supreme Court has 
properly and correctly interpreted and applied the law and that existing law 
should not be altered or extended.”492 Given the state of the law in Arkansas, 
landlords and tenants should make their intentions regarding the terms of a 
lease agreement clear in a written lease for the protection of both parties. Of 
482. Sparks v. Murray, 120 Ark. 17, 20, 178 S.W. 909, 910 (1915); Haizlip v. Rosenberg, 
63 Ark. 430, 433, 39 S.W. 60, 60 (1897).
483. Fletcher v. Joseph Pfeifer Clothing Co., 103 Ark. 318, 324, 146 S.W. 864, 866 
(1912).
484. Oliver v. Hartzell, 170 Ark. 512, 515–16, 280 S.W. 979, 980–81 (1926).
485. Pearson v. Henrickson, 336 Ark. 12, 20, 983 S.W.2d 419, 424 (1999).
486. Denton v. Pennington, 82 Ark. App. 179, 183, 119 S.W.3d 519, 521 (2003).
487. See, e.g., Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 41, 60 S.W.3d 415, 420 (2001).
488. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397, 308 A.2d 528, 533–534 (1973).
489. Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark. 623, 627, 932 S.W.2d 766, 768 (1996). See also Milli-
gan v. Chesterfield Vill. GP, L,L,C,, 239 S.W.3d 613, 629 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Lemle v. 
Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 433, 462 P.2d, 470, 474 (1969).
490. Sargent, 113 N.H. at 397, 308 A.2d at 534.
491. Propst, 326 Ark. 623, 626–27, 932 S.W.2d at 768.
492. 2005 Ark. Acts 928 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (2012)).
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course, there will be many situations where the parties will decide to use an 
abbreviated lease agreement or simply operate on an oral agreement. Ac-
knowledging this, attorneys and others advising landlords and tenants 
should emphasize the importance of a written document. Toward that end, 
attached as an Addendum is a selection of proposed form language that can 
be used and adapted in lease agreements in the event it is the desire of the 
parties to assign maintenance obligations in a manner other than that provid-
ed by common law.
ADDENDUM
To Include a Warranty of Habitability:
This paragraph represents an attempt to craft a model warranty of hab-
itability that, in the experience of the author, could be reasonably acceptable 
to landlords who are in the business of providing residential properties for 
lease (as opposed to landlords who are not routinely engaged in such busi-
ness, such as a homeowner or administrator of an estate who is temporarily 
leasing a house because such a landlord may not be familiar with, or capable 
of, providing the services typically offered by professional residential land-
lords).
Landlord hereby covenants with Tenant that the Premises shall be main-
tained in a habitable condition.  For purposes of this Agreement, "habita-
ble condition" shall mean (and shall be limited to):  (i) maintaining the 
roof and building envelope from intrusion of water; (ii) only if the Prem-
ises is provided with central heat and air conditioning, maintaining the 
heating, ventilation and air condition system in a manner that it can cool 
the Premises to at least 75ºF during the summer months and heat the 
Premises to at least 70ºF, both temperatures to be measured at the loca-
tion of the thermostat; (iii) providing functioning sewer service; (iv) 
providing functioning potable water service; (v) providing safe electrical 
service in the Premises; and (vi) maintaining the Premises in compliance 
with all applicable building and housing codes (provided, such covenant 
shall not obligate Landlord to make modifications that are not required 
under applicable law because the Premises qualifies for an exception un-
der applicable grandfathering).  
Landlord has no duty to inspect the Premises and is depending on Tenant 
to notify Landlord of any necessary repairs or maintenance.  Landlord 
shall not be responsible for inspecting the Premises to determine whether 
it is in a habitable condition but shall undertake such maintenance or re-
pairs as are necessary to restore the Premises to a habitable condition 
within a reasonable time after Landlord's receipt of notice, such time to 
be not less than [____] days and not more than [_____] days; provided, 
Landlord shall undertake the repairs as quickly as possible if necessary 
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for the safety of the occupants of the Premises.  Landlord has no obliga-
tion to conduct after-hours or weekend repairs unless (i) the repair is 
necessary for the safety of the occupants of the Premises or (ii) Tenant 
agrees to pay for the additional cost of such after-hours or weekend re-
pairs.  
Tenant's remedies for Landlord's failure to maintain the Premises in hab-
itable condition after notice and opportunity to cure the same in accord-
ance with the foregoing paragraph shall be limited to:  (i) withholding 
payment of rent for the days that the Premises remains uninhabitable; 
and (ii) recovering the cost of temporary alternative housing (not to ex-
ceed $_____ per day) if the Premises remains uninhabitable for more 
than [specify number of days] days; provided, in lieu of restoring the 
Premises to a habitable condition, Landlord may terminate this Agree-
ment and have no further liability after delivering notice of termination 
by paying Tenant the reasonable costs of moving to new housing (not to 
exceed $______).  In the event the Premises are not in a habitable condi-
tion due to a casualty beyond the control of Landlord, Landlord shall 
have the option to terminate this Agreement in lieu of paying Tenant for 
the cost of temporary alternative housing or moving to new housing.  
The maintenance obligations of Landlord pursuant to this Section do not 
obligate Landlord to pay the cost of the utility service unless otherwise 
provided in this Agreement.  The maintenance obligations of Landlord 
pursuant to this Section do not include temporary service outages caused 
by forces beyond Landlord's control (such as an electrical service disrup-
tion caused by a storm).  Tenant is responsible for the cost of replacing 
light bulbs and air filters.
Tenant shall immediately reimburse Landlord for the cost of the mainte-
nance or repairs necessitated by the negligence or intentional misconduct 
of Tenant or its guests.  Landlord shall have no liability to Tenant for 
damages resulting from maintenance or repairs necessitated by the negli-
gence or intentional misconduct of Tenant or its guests.  Landlord shall 
not be liable for damages to Tenant caused by the negligence or inten-
tional misconduct of third-parties, including other tenants, unless Land-
lord has received written notice of the same and had an opportunity to 
repair the same in accordance with the timeframes for repair specified in 
this Section.  Such waiver of liability includes, without limitation, dam-
age to or hazardous conditions created in the common areas shared with 
other tenants. Landlord hereby covenants with Tenant that the Premises 
shall be maintained in a habitable condition.  For purposes of this 
Agreement, "habitable condition" shall mean (and shall be limited to):  
(i) maintaining the roof and building envelope from intrusion of water; 
(ii) only if the Premises is provided with central heat and air condition-
ing, maintaining the heating, ventilation and air condition system in a 
manner that it can cool the Premises to at least 75ºF during the summer 
months and heat the Premises to at least 70ºF, both temperatures to be 
measured at the location of the thermostat; (iii) providing functioning 
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sewer service; (iv) providing functioning potable water service; (v) 
providing safe electrical service in the Premises; and (vi) maintaining the 
Premises in compliance with all applicable building and housing codes 
(provided, such covenant shall not obligate Landlord to make modifica-
tions that are not required under applicable law because the Premises 
qualifies for an exception under applicable grandfathering).  
Landlord has no duty to inspect the Premises and is depending on Tenant 
to notify Landlord of any necessary repairs or maintenance.  Landlord 
shall not be responsible for inspecting the Premises to determine whether 
it is in a habitable condition but shall undertake such maintenance or re-
pairs as are necessary to restore the Premises to a habitable condition 
within a reasonable time after Landlord's receipt of notice, such time to 
be not less than [____] days and not more than [_____] days; provided, 
Landlord shall undertake the repairs as quickly as possible if necessary 
for the safety of the occupants of the Premises.  Landlord has no obliga-
tion to conduct after-hours or weekend repairs unless (i) the repair is 
necessary for the safety of the occupants of the Premises or (ii) Tenant 
agrees to pay for the additional cost of such after-hours or weekend re-
pairs.  
Tenant's remedies for Landlord's failure to maintain the Premises in hab-
itable condition after notice and opportunity to cure the same in accord-
ance with the foregoing paragraph shall be limited to:  (i) withholding 
payment of rent for the days that the Premises remains uninhabitable; 
and (ii) recovering the cost of temporary alternative housing (not to ex-
ceed $_____ per day) if the Premises remains uninhabitable for more 
than [specify number of days] days; provided, in lieu of restoring the 
Premises to a habitable condition, Landlord may terminate this Agree-
ment and have no further liability after delivering notice of termination 
by paying Tenant the reasonable costs of moving to new housing (not to 
exceed $______).  In the event the Premises are not in a habitable condi-
tion due to a casualty beyond the control of Landlord, Landlord shall 
have the option to terminate this Agreement in lieu of paying Tenant for 
the cost of temporary alternative housing or moving to new housing.  
The maintenance obligations of Landlord pursuant to this Section do not 
obligate Landlord to pay the cost of the utility service unless otherwise 
provided in this Agreement.  The maintenance obligations of Landlord 
pursuant to this Section do not include temporary service outages caused 
by forces beyond Landlord's control (such as an electrical service disrup-
tion caused by a storm).  Tenant is responsible for the cost of replacing 
light bulbs and air filters.
Tenant shall immediately reimburse Landlord for the cost of the mainte-
nance or repairs necessitated by the negligence or intentional misconduct 
of Tenant or its guests.  Landlord shall have no liability to Tenant for 
damages resulting from maintenance or repairs necessitated by the negli-
gence or intentional misconduct of Tenant or its guests.  Landlord shall 
not be liable for damages to Tenant caused by the negligence or inten-
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tional misconduct of third-parties, including other tenants, unless Land-
lord has received written notice of the same and had an opportunity to 
repair the same in accordance with the timeframes for repair specified in 
this Section.  Such waiver of liability includes, without limitation, dam-
age to or hazardous conditions created in the common areas shared with 
other tenants.  
To Include a Comprehensive Maintenance Obligation:
This language is primarily for use in the context of residential housing.
Landlord hereby covenants with Tenant that the Premises shall be main-
tained in working order and in a habitable condition.  For purposes of 
this Agreement, "habitable condition" shall mean:  (i) maintaining the 
roof and building envelope from intrusion of water; (ii) only if the Prem-
ises is provided with central heat and air conditioning, maintaining the 
heating, ventilation and air condition system in a manner that it can heat 
the Premises to at least 70ºF and cool the Premises to at least 75ºF, both 
temperatures to be measured at the location of the thermostat; (iii) 
providing functioning sewer service; (iv) providing functioning potable 
water service; (v) providing safe electrical service in the Premises; and 
(vi) maintaining the Premises in compliance with all applicable building 
codes (provided, such covenant shall not obligate Landlord to make 
modifications that are not required under applicable law because the 
Premises qualifies for an exception under applicable grandfathering).  
In addition to maintaining the Premises in a habitable condition, Land-
lord's maintenance obligations shall also include maintaining and repair-
ing all mechanical, electrical and structural elements of the Premises, in-
cluding common areas shared with other tenants associated with the 
Premises, subject to the following maintenance obligations that are the 
responsibility of Tenant:  [List of Tenant maintenance obligations such 
as mowing or maintaining the landscaping].  
Landlord has no duty to inspect the Premises and is depending on Tenant 
to notify Landlord of any necessary repairs or maintenance.  Landlord 
shall not be responsible for inspecting the Premises to determine whether 
it is in a habitable condition but shall undertake such maintenance or re-
pairs as are necessary to restore the Premises to a habitable condition 
within a reasonable time after Landlord's receipt of notice, such time to 
be not less than [____] days and not more than [_____] days; provided, 
Landlord shall undertake the repairs as quickly as possible if necessary 
for the safety of the occupants of the Premises.  Landlord has no obliga-
tion to conduct after-hours or weekend repairs unless (i) the repair is 
necessary for the safety of the occupants of the Premises or (ii) Tenant 
agrees to pay for the additional cost of such after-hours or weekend re-
pairs.  
2013] CAVEAT WHO? 1111
Tenant's remedies for Landlord's failure to maintain the Premises in hab-
itable condition after notice and opportunity to cure the same in accord-
ance with the foregoing paragraph shall be limited to:  (i) withholding 
payment of rent for the days that the Premises remain uninhabitable; and 
(ii) recovering the cost of temporary alternative housing (not to exceed 
$_____ per day) if the Premises remain uninhabitable for more than 
[specify number of days] days; provided, in lieu of restoring the Premis-
es to a habitable condition, Landlord may terminate this Agreement and 
have no further liability after delivering notice of termination by paying 
Tenant the reasonable costs of moving to new housing (not to exceed 
$______).  In the event the Premises are not in a habitable condition due 
to a casualty beyond the control of Landlord, Landlord shall have the op-
tion to terminate this Agreement in lieu of paying Tenant for the cost of 
temporary alternative housing or moving to new housing.  The mainte-
nance obligations of Landlord pursuant to this Section do not obligate 
Landlord to pay the cost of the utility service unless otherwise provided 
in this Agreement.  The maintenance obligations of Landlord pursuant to 
this Section do not include temporary service outages caused by forces 
beyond Landlord's control (such as an electrical service disruption 
caused by a storm).  Tenant is responsible for the cost of replacing light 
bulbs and air filters.
Tenant shall immediately reimburse Landlord for the cost of the mainte-
nance or repairs necessitated by the negligence or intentional misconduct 
of Tenant or its guests.  Landlord shall have no liability to Tenant for 
damages resulting from maintenance or repairs necessitated by the negli-
gence or intentional misconduct of Tenant or its guests.  Landlord shall 
not be liable for damages to Tenant caused by the negligence or inten-
tional misconduct of third-parties, including other tenants, unless Land-
lord has received written notice of the same and had an opportunity to 
repair the same in accordance with the timeframes for repair specified in 
this Section.  Such waiver of liability includes, without limitation, dam-
age to or hazardous conditions created in the common areas shared with 
other tenants.
To Include a Maintenance Obligation Limited to the Building Enve-
lope, HVAC System and Common Areas:
This language is primarily for use in the context of a commercial lease.
Landlord shall maintain the roof, exterior walls and structural compo-
nents, sprinkler system, exterior canopies, gutters, water spouts, utility 
services extending to the service connection, landscaping, HVAC (heat-
ing, ventilation and air conditioning) system, common areas shared with 
other tenants (if any), parking lot and driveway in satisfactory condition 
during the term (subject to contribution from Tenant for damage to any 
of these structures caused by Tenant, its employees, agents, licensees or 
invitees).  Landlord shall not be responsible for any damages caused by 
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failure to maintain any of the foregoing items unless and until Landlord 
has received written notice of a problem and has had a reasonable time to 
repair the same, such time to be not less than [_____] days and not more 
than [____] days after Landlord's receipt of such notice.  Landlord has no 
obligation to conduct after-hours or weekend repairs unless Tenant 
agrees to pay for the additional cost of such after-hours or weekend re-
pairs.  Tenant shall keep and maintain, at its sole cost and expense, in 
good order and repair, all of the Premises for which the Landlord is not 
obligated to repair and maintain, including, without limitation, the interi-
or of the Premises, generally, plate glass, storefront and doors, interior 
plumbing and electrical systems and fixtures, Tenant's trade fixtures, 
vents and fans, cleanliness of the sidewalk directly in front of Tenant's 
Premises, and any portion of the Premises which is designated for the 
exclusive use of Tenant.
To Disclaim Liability for Criminal Acts:
Though Arkansas does not impose liability on landlords for the crimi-
nal acts of third parties absent an assumption of an obligation to do so in the 
lease agreement, landlords may be concerned that including maintenance 
obligations in a lease could be interpreted as an assumption of that duty.  
The following language is intend to disclaim liability for criminal acts in 
those situations where a landlord may be hesitant to undertake maintenance 
obligations because of the associated potential for liability due to criminal 
acts.
Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement making Landlord re-
sponsible for any maintenance, repair or upkeep of the Premises (if any), 
Landlord expressly disclaims, and Tenant waives, any liability related to 
any damages, whether to persons or property, caused by the criminal acts 
of third parties.  No undertaking by Landlord, or provision of security 
devices (which may include, without limitation, locks, gates, lights or 
security guards), shall be deemed an assumption of a duty by Landlord to 
protect against criminal acts of third parties.  Landlord shall not be liable 
to Tenant for the failure or inadequacy of any such security devices (if 
any).
